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REGULATING LISTINGS IN A GLOBAL MARKET*
STEVEN M. DAV1DOFF*"

Non-U.S. companies increasingly appear to spurn U.S. stock markets
and choose to list their securities abroad. The drivers behind this shift
are complex, but many believe that a principalcause is regulatory. The
SEC has promulgated arguably overburdensome, one-size-fits-all rules
that fail to account for the heterogeneous desires of non-U.S.
companies for differing levels of regulation. This was even before the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Previous proposals to ameliorate this problem have all suffered from
the same analyticalflaw: they have approached this issue from the
supply side and argued that regulation should be structured to meet the
desires of issuers. This Article is an attempt to reformulate this debate.
I argue that analysis of the proper level of U.S. regulationfor non-U.S.
companies should take into strong account the demand-side interests of
U.S. retailinvestors who are deprived of investing opportunitiesabroad
when non-U.S. companies do not list in the United States. The SEC
should therefore craft regulation to foster investor equality and
opportunity and ensure that global investments are, to the extent
feasible, available to U.S. investors.
To achieve this, the SEC should adopt a different regulatory standard
for non-U.S. companies listing both in the United States and in their
home market. This regulatory standard would borrow from mutual
recognition principles embedded in conflict-of-laws jurisprudence.
Under this standard, a non-U.S. company's compliance with its home
market rules would be deemed satisfactory unless the quality of home
market regulation was deemed to be sufficiently incomparable to U.S.
regulationsuch that the benefits of investor access were outweighed by
insufficient investor protections. This approach would create a
regulatory scheme that would serve U.S. interests by attractingforeign
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listings while sufficiently protecting domestic investors. It would also
benefit U.S. stock markets and other U.S. market actors by allowing
them to differentiate and provide regulatory products tailored to the
individualizednature of the non-domestic listing decision.
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INTRODUCTION

Finance is now global. The halcyon days when the U.S. capital
markets were the primary place to raise capital and list securities are over.
Non-U.S. capital markets have matured; issuers have increasing latitude
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and choice as to where they list and obtain capital.' They have exercised
this freedom with a vengeance. It now appears that some non-U.S. issuers2
intentionally spurn the United States and choose to list their securities and
raise capital abroad.3 The drivers behind this shift are complex, but many
believe that a principal cause is regulatory. Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 4 many
non-U.S. issuers perceive the United States as a litigation-prone,
overregulated market.5 This perception is buttressed by recent empirical
studies that have found that the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
precipitated statistically abnormal share price declines and lowered the
equity premium for non-U.S. issuers listed in the United States.6 We are
1. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 29-39 (2006) [hereinafter INTERIM CAPITAL MARKETS
at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/ 1.30CommitteeInterim_
REPORT],
available
ReportREV2.pdf (surveying the market for global listings and asserting that the U.S. markets are
in comparative competitive decline).
2. Generally, a corporate issuer is classified under the U.S. securities laws as either a U.S.
domestic issuer or a foreign private issuer. Foreign private issuers benefit from certain
exemptions under the U.S. securities laws that are not available to U.S. domestic issuers. These
exemptions and differences are described infra Parts II.A.I & III.A.2. For simplicity's sake,
throughout this Article, foreign private issuers are also referred to as "non-U.S. companies,"
"non-U.S. issuers," or "foreign companies" and are generally deemed to refer to foreign
companies. The term "foreign private issuer," though, has a specific meaning under Rule 3b-4 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended ("Exchange Act"), and in certain instances,
issuers with significant U.S. ties but that are organized and doing business outside of the United
States do not qualify as foreign private issuers and are subject to the U.S. domestic issuer rules.
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4 (2006).
3. See generally Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Flow of International Listings (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=956987 (finding strong evidence that U.S. stock markets have
experienced a decrease in frequency of non-U.S. listings post-Sarbanes-Oxley). This trend is
further discussed infra Part I.
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 800 (2002).
5. See, e.g., INTERIM CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-49 (asserting that the
regulatory and litigation burden on non-U.S. issuers in U.S. markets is inordinate in comparison
to non-U.S. markets); Robert G. DeLaMater, Recent Trends in SEC Regulation of Foreign
Issuers: How the U.S. Regulatory Regime Is Affecting the United States' Historic Position As the
World's Principal Capital Market, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 109, 116 (2006) (arguing that in the
wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, "the U.S. model is not as well regarded as it was a few years
ago; it is no longer the gold standard to which other regulatory schemes could only aspire"); Greg
Ip, Is a U.S. Listing Worth the Effort?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006, at CI (reporting that non-U.S.
issuers increasingly perceive declining benefit to a U.S. listing in light of heightened U.S.
regulation).
6. See generally Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-US Companies
Cross-Listed in the US, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 195 (2007), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=876624
(finding that stock prices of foreign issuers cross-listed in the United States experienced
significant negative abnormal returns during key announcements indicating that the SarbanesOxley Act would fully apply to cross-listed foreign issuers); Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Cross-ListingPremium, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1857 (2007) (finding that non-U.S. companies listing
in the United States experienced an abnormal decline in market premiums post-Sarbanes-Oxley
as measured using Tobin's q and market-to-book ratios); Craig Doidge et al., Has New York

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

discovering that the much-hyped regulatory response to perceived market
failures may have had an unanticipated cost.
This places the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in
a difficult position. If non-U.S. issuers are indeed abandoning the U.S.
capital markets in part due to overregulation, should the SEC respond by
alleviating this regulatory burden? This raises the specter of a race to the
bottom as regulators and stock markets compete globally for listings.7 It
also implicates the appropriate base level of protection for U.S. investors:
what is the right balance between regulation that will attract non-U.S.
issuers to the U.S. market and at the same time provide the appropriate
protections for U.S. investors? If one assumes that attracting non-U.S.
issuers is the goal, the question becomes one of the proper scope of
regulation for non-U.S. issuers accessing the U.S. capital markets.8
Previous scholarship on this issue has focused on the concerns of
issuers and has fallen into two strains. Stephen J. Choi and Andrew T.
Gutzman in a co-authored article and Roberta Romano in her own works
have argued that issuers (whatever their origin) should be permitted to

Become Less Competitive in Global Markets? 36 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working
Paper No. 173/2007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.comabstract-id=982193 (finding that the
average valuation premium for cross-listed firms from 1990 to 2001 was 17.5% compared to
14.3% from 2002 to 2005); Philip G. Berger et al., The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Cross-listed
at
(Jan.
8,
2005)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
Companies
http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/facbios/file/SOX%20and%20ADRs%20010805%20updated.pdf
(comparing a value-weighted portfolio of non-U.S. issuers listed in the Unites States to a similar
portfolio of U.S. issuers and finding a statistically significant negative stock price reaction to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in comparison to U.S. issuers); Xi Li, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and CrossListed Foreign Private Issuers 29 (2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=952433 (finding that "while the abnormal returns at the delisting and
deregistration announcements are negative before the passage of SOX, they are positive after the
passage of SOX"). But see Haidan Li et al., Market Reaction to Events Surrounding the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Earnings Management (Sep. 24, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=475163 (finding significantly positive
abnormal stock returns associated with the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's requirements).
7. See generally Robert Bloomfield & Maureen O'Hara, Can Transparent Markets
Survive?, 55 J. FIN. ECON. 425 (2000) (predicting that in equilibrium among markets, a race to the
bottom results and low-transparency markets squeeze out high-transparency ones).
8. The question is intentionally limited to non-U.S. issuers; it does not encompass U.S.
domestic issuers. The market for regulation and listings of U.S. domestic issuers is largely a
captive one. Globally-for legal, cultural, and economic reasons-issuers tend to make their
primary listing their home market. In the United States, this is a virtual legal requirement due to
the structure of U.S. securities regulation. U.S. securities laws largely foreclose the ability of any
significant U.S. domestic issuer to list abroad without a concurrent U.S. listing. The competitive
market for non-U.S. issuers simply does not exist for U.S. domestic issuers. The driving forces
and interests in setting this regulation are therefore different, and any theory of regulation for
either would not be wholly analogous. The regulation of U.S. domestic issuers is thus beyond the
scope of this Article and grist for a companion one.
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freely select their governing regulation from any jurisdiction.9 This choice
would create a market with regulators competing for issuers by offering a
menu of varying levels of regulation.'0 For example, a German company
could list in the United States and choose to be regulated by the securities
laws of a third jurisdiction, such as Japan." A race to the top would
consequently develop: issuers would migrate to those regulatory schemes
that produced the economically optimal regulatory regime for that issuer.12
Regulators would then compete to provide regulation that would attract the
highest number of listings. 3 This regulatory portability argument has been
criticized on a variety of grounds, including the simple fact that most
issuers have overwhelming incentives to-and historically have-listed
only in their home market.'4 Yet these critics largely have not offered any
9. Professors Choi and Guzman specifically propose a form of portable reciprocity in
which issuers would choose their governing legal regime or elect to have no such regime govern
their securities transaction. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:
Rethinking the InternationalReach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 907 (1998).
In a book and two articles, Professor Romano proffers an argument for "competitive federalism"
in which issuers would self-select their securities regulator from any jurisdiction, including those
of the U.S. states. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM IN
SECURITIES REGULATION (2002); Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International
Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 387 (2001) [hereinafter Romano, The Need for
Competition]; Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2427 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, Empowering Investors].
10. Professor Romano, in particular, argues free regulatory choice as a spur to regulatory
competition to support issuer choice. Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 9, at 38992. Professors Choi and Guzman also briefly assert these benefits in support of issuer choice, but
mostly rest their argument upon a consumer-based model whereby issuers as consumers benefit
from a diversity of regulatory choice. Choi & Guzman, supra note 9, at 922-23.
11. Professors Choi and Guzman fully set out the parameters and complications of such a
system in their article. Choi & Guzman, supra note 9, at 922-45; see also William J. Carney,
JurisdictionalChoice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 717, 745 (2001) (arguing that
market forces support adoption of a system of issuer regulatory choice but noting that "[m]uch
remains to be done to flesh out an operating system, complete with a workable system of
enforcing whatever rules issuers may adopt"). Professor Romano is more concerned with the
theoretical benefits of such a system and with rebutting its detractors than with its actual details,
although she does extensively address possible conflict-of-laws issues. Romano, The Need for
Competition, supra note 9, at 389-92.
12. Professor Romano has put forth this argument forcefully in the debate concerning state
charters, and so, not surprisingly, this argument is the foundation for her proposal concerning
issuer choice and consequent international regulatory competition. Romano, The Need for
Competition, supra note 9, at 392-97.
13. Id. at 392-94.
14. See, e.g., Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A Political Economy of
Issuer Choice in International Securities Regulation, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (applying
public choice theory to conclude that a regime of "issuer choice is politically implausible").
Issuer choice has also come under attack on a number of other grounds. Professor Merritt Fox
has argued that such a system would produce a non-optimal outcome since an issuer's "private
costs of disclosure would be greater than the social costs of such a disclosure." Merritt B. Fox,
The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 563, 564 (2001) (emphasis removed); see also
Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor
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thematic countersolution other than justifying and arguing for the current
regulatory regime. And, ultimately, none of these proposals offers a
prescriptive norm as to the appropriate level of U.S. regulation for issuers,
including non-U.S. issuers.
The second strain of scholarship has focused on this more specific
question. These scholars have examined the motivations driving non-U.S.
issuers to list in the United States and voluntarily subject themselves to
U.S. regulation. 5 An influential theory views U.S. regulation as a plus: a
species of cross-bonding whereby high-quality, non-U.S. issuers seek to
raise their profile and equity premium by subjecting themselves to
enhanced U.S. regulation, in addition to any regulation imposed by their
home market. 6 Thus, more stringent U.S. regulation of non-U.S. issuers,
provided it is rationally based, is likely to attract the most desirable capital

Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1345-47 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, Retaining Mandatory
Securities Disclosure]; Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S.
Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 MICH. L. REV. 696, 749 (1998).
Professor James Cox has also argued that a multiple disclosure scheme will have a disparate and
negative impact upon investors. James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1229-35 (1999). Finally, Professor Robert Prentice has argued that an
issuer choice scheme will exacerbate the agency problem of management rent seeking and
provoke a race to the bottom among regulators. Robert A. Prentice, Regulatory Competition in
Securities Law: A Dream (That Should Be) Deferred, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1228-30 (2005).
15. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and
Stock Market Competition on InternationalCorporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757,
1763 (2002) (arguing that issuers cross-list in order to cross-bond and avail themselves of higher
disclosure regimes to "enhance their share price and become able to raise additional equity at
lower cost"); James A. Fanto & Roberta S. Karmel, A Report on the Attitudes of Foreign
CompaniesRegarding a U.S. Listing, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 51, 72 (1997) (surveying non-U.S.
issuers and finding that they justify listing in U.S. markets for a variety of reasons, including
disclosure requirements, a specific U.S. business purpose, the benefits of U.S. capital markets,
and industry-specific reasons); G. Andrew Karolyi, Why Do Companies List Shares Abroad?: A
Survey of the Evidence and Its ManagerialImplications, 7 FIN. MKTS., INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 1,
13 (1998) (finding that cross-listing issuers benefit from higher valuations and trading liquidity);
Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 141, 142 (2003) [hereinafter Licht, Cross-Listing] (rejecting the bonding hypothesis as a
justification for cross-listing and arguing that "[tlhe dominant factors in the choice of cross-listing
destination markets are access to cheaper finance and enhancing the issuer's visibility"); Amir N.
Licht, ManagerialOpportunism and Foreign Listing: Some Direct Evidence, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 325, 326 (2001) [hereinafter Licht, Managerial Opportunism] (arguing that crosslistings are primarily the product of "managerial opportunism").
16. This theory, known as cross-bonding, has principally been put forth by Professor Coffee
who argues "strong legal standards ... attract, rather than repel, issuers who are cross-listing."
Coffee, supra note 15, at 1762. Professor Coffee has recently expanded upon and refined his
theory, arguing further that "the greater institutional commitment of the United States to
enforcement ... may be the underlying motor force that explains the . . . 'bonding hypothesis.' "
John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement 16 (Colum. L. & Econ.
Working Paper No. 304, 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=967482.
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and issuers.' 7 This argument appeared to be quite right at the turn of the
millennium when non-U.S. issuers were flocking to list in the United
States.'" In a post-Sarbanes-Oxley world, though, it has come under
significant stress as non-U.S. issuers increasingly cite excessive regulation
as a reason to avoid U.S. capital markets. 9 Cross-bonding may therefore
provide an explanation as to why some non-U.S. issuers list in the United
States, but it now seems clear that it cannot definitively provide a holistic
framework for the appropriate level of U.S. regulation.
This Article is an attempt to reformulate the debate. The previous
scholarship has focused on a supply-side solution, looking to the desires of
issuers to justify regulation.20 This Article proposes an alternative. I argue
that the proper level of U.S. regulation for non-U.S. issuers should not be
primarily the regulatory concerns of issuers. It should instead strongly take
into account the demand-side interests of investors who provide the
necessary capital. U.S. investors are today segregated into two groups:
sophisticated and non-sophisticated (retail) investors.2 1 Sophisticated
investors have the freedom to-and do-invest globally. For them,
whether an issuer is listed in the United States or whether there is
regulatory competition is irrelevant to their ability to invest.22 This is not
true for the U.S. retail investor. 23 For the average U.S. investor, it is
prohibitively difficult and expensive to invest in non-U.S. issuers who are

17. Coffee, supra note 15, at 1827-29.
18. Professor Coffee's article was published immediately in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and at the close of a period of unprecedented growth in non-U.S. listings on U.S. markets.
Though he did not fully assess the Act's impact, he appeared to be nonplussed, theorizing that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act's increased regulation could serve to reinforce his cross-bonding theory by
further attracting high-quality issuers. Id. at 1826.
19. See supra note 5.
20. This directive focus has largely been uniform. The one notable exception is the rather
impractical proposal put forth by Professor Choi for a securities regulatory scheme that does not
regulate issuers but rather regulates and licenses investors. See generally Stephen Choi,
Regulating Investors, Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal,88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000).
21. Sophisticated investors under the U.S. securities laws are those who exceed minimum
wealth thresholds with the thresholds variant depending upon the type of offering. For purposes
of this Article and unless specified otherwise, sophisticated investors are defined as investors with
These are termed "qualified institutional
over $100 million in aggregate investments.
beneficiaries" under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended ("Securities Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a77aa (2000 & Supp. 2004), and are typified by institutional investment funds. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144A (1991) (Securities Act definition of qualified institutional beneficiaries). I employ
this definition since, under the Securities Act, these investors have the fewest restrictions on their
freedom to invest. Accordingly, although slightly overbroad, I term investors not meeting this
threshold as non-sophisticated or "retail" investors. See infra notes 230-37 and accompanying
text for a further discussion of the regulatory freedom sophisticated investors have to invest.
22. See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
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not listed in the United States.24 Retail investors are thus denied
opportunities to invest in non-U.S. issuers who choose not to list in the
United States. They are ring-fenced, confined to investing in issuers listed
in the United States and denied the acknowledged benefits of
diversification that sophisticated U.S. investors easily obtain."
If we recognize this investor disparity, it leads to an important
conclusion as to the appropriate level of U.S. regulation of non-U.S.
issuers. The SEC should craft regulation based on principles of investor
equality and opportunity, and global investments should, to the extent
feasible, be made available to all U.S. investors who desire them.
Accordingly, the SEC should adopt regulations for non-U.S. issuers that
easily permit them to list and raise capital in the United States. This would
be a form of mutual recognition common under conflict-of-laws principles
whereby a non-U.S. issuer's compliance with its home market rules would
be deemed satisfactory.26 No other significant U.S. regulation would be
imposed upon such non-U.S. issuers unless the quality of home market
regulation and enforcement were deemed to be sufficiently different from
U.S. regulation to outweigh the benefits of investor access. To determine
these base-level, necessary investor protections, the SEC would look to the
fundamental interests of U.S. investors themselves. If it does look at these
interests, the SEC should find that the regulation of most developed
countries would suffice. This is particularly true in light of the increasing
international harmonization of securities disclosure laws.27 This approach
would also be a significant expansion of the successful program adopted by
24. Id.
25. This disparity is further discussed infra Part III.A.3.
26. See infra notes 333-35 and accompanying text.
27. There is a global trend among regulators to cooperate and harmonize disclosure and
listings standards, particularly with respect to accounting rules. See Roberta S. Karmel, Will
Convergence of FinancialDisclosure Standards Change SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers?, 26
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 485, 488-501 (2000) (surveying legal trends towards harmonization of U.S.
financial disclosure standards with international ones). See generally J. William Hicks,
Harmonization of Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Share Offerings: Approaching an
"International Passport" to Capital Markets?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 361 (2002)
(assessing the prospects for future harmonization of disclosure standards in the global market).
There are limits to this harmonization, and as Professors William Bratton and Joseph McCahery
have rightly pointed out, global convergence is unlikely to eliminate core systematic differences
due to their fundamental nature. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative
Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference,
38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213, 219 (1999). Harmonization thus has its limits and is not a
competitive solution to the global market for listings; rather, it has the potential to be a remedy
for specific areas of difference that are amenable to harmonization such as accounting and
disclosure standards. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospectsfor
Global Convergence in CorporateGovernance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 650
(1999) (agreeing that from a "path dependency perspective ... formal convergence faces too
many obstacles to be predicted" (emphasis removed)).
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the SEC with respect to certain Canadian issuers through its MultiJurisdictional Disclosure Regime.28 In the same vein, non-U.S. issuers who
do not have a listing outside the United States or do not maintain a primary
listing in a sufficiently high-standard regulatory and enforcement regime
would continue to be subject to heightened, more tailored regulation similar
to that currently applied to non-U.S. issuers. Non-U.S. issuers would also
still maintain the option of voluntarily selecting a higher level of U.S.
regulation for cross-bonding or other purposes if they deemed it
appropriate. 9
A demand-side theory of regulation, one crafted from the investor
perspective, thus establishes a general principle guiding future SEC
regulation of non-U.S. issuers. This is a coherent norm which in
application also competitively positions the U.S. stock markets in the
global market for listings. The U.S. stock markets would no longer be
constrained, limited to offering the singular, one-size-fits-all securities
regulation that the SEC currently requires. Rather, U.S. stock markets
could then offer targeted regulation compatible with the individualized
needs of non-U.S. issuers and competitive with the regulatory choice
offered by other global stock markets. Accordingly, under this proposal,
issuers should benefit through expanded regulatory choice that recognizes
their preferences for varying levels of regulation when accessing the U.S.
market. The U.S. stock markets should also gain from the ability to offer
this regulatory choice, producing increased listings and trading volume.
Part I of this Article outlines the current global market for listings and
assesses its competitive element. I find that the United States did indeed
lose competitive stature in the global competition for listings from 2002
through 2006. But this decline appears to be primarily a comparative one
due to the inevitable maturation of non-U.S. capital markets rather than one
attributable to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or any other recent change in U.S.
regulation. Moreover, I find that almost all the major European stock
markets during this time also experienced declining numbers of nondomestic listings, while the Asian markets entirely failed to attract any such
listings. This leads to a number of conclusions concerning the current
competitive state of the U.S. markets that run counter to the prevalent
public consensus.
Part II then sets out the main actors who define this global market, as
well as their sometimes divergent and competing interests. Part III details
the current jurisdictional approaches to regulation of issuers. Part V draws
on the information and conclusions in the previous part to define the true
28. See infra note 335 and accompanying text.
29. The parameters of this proposal are more fully set forth infra Part V.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

parameters of the global competition for listings and the competitive
position of the United States therein. Part V concludes by referencing the
established interests of the main actors who define this global market to put
forth a normative regulatory model for non-U.S. issuers that encompasses
investor access and equality principles.
I. THE GLOBAL LISTINGS MARKET
This Part surveys the current state of the global listings market. More
specifically, it examines the leading internationally recognized stock
markets in Asia, Europe, and the United States.3" The goal is threefold: to
assess the comparative strength of the U.S. market vis-A-vis its global
competitors; to contextually place the recent decline, if any, of the U.S.
market; and to discern current trends in the global listings market that may
affect the U.S. market's future competitive position. The conclusions
drawn from these analyses will support this Article's development and
assessment of a prescriptive norm for the regulation of non-U.S. issuers.
A.

The United States

In the United States, the two primary stock markets are the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and the Nasdaq. The NYSE is the larger of the
two and is the largest in the world. As of December 31, 2006, the NYSE
listed 2,764 issuers3 with an aggregate market capitalization of $25
trillion.32 This compares to the Nasdaq which, as of December 31, 2006,
had 3,388 issuers 33 with an aggregate market capitalization of $4.201
trillion.34 In the year 2006, on an average trading day, over 1.827 billion
shares, valued at over $68.29 billion, were traded on the NYSE 3 5 and over

30. I discuss the attributes that make these stock markets "leading" ones infra notes 268-73
and accompanying text.
31. New York Stock Exchange, Facts & Figures, http://www.nysedata.com/nysedata/
Default.aspx?tabid=l 15 (follow "Listed Companies" hyperlink; then follow "NYSE GroupNumber of Issuers" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
32. New York Stock Exchange, Facts & Figures, http://www.nysedata.com/nysedata/
Default.aspx?tabid=l 15 (follow "NYSE Historical Statistics" hyperlink; then follow "Market
capitalization of NYSE companies" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
33. Nasdaq Trader, Monthly Market Activity, http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/asp/
tdMarkSpec.asp?RepType= 1&cboMARDate= 12%2F1%2F2006&MARSearchDate=12%2F2006
(last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
34. E-mail from Alex Garay, Economic Researcher, NASDAQ, to Josh Terebelo, Research
Assistant to Professor Steven M. Davidoff, Wayne State University Law School (Feb. 12, 2007,
11:51 EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
35. New York Stock Exchange, Facts & Figures, http://www.nysedata.com/nysedata/
Default.aspx?tabid=1 15 (follow "Market Activity" hyperlink on left; then follow "NYSE Group
Volume in All Stocks Traded") (calculations based on 2006 chart) (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
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1.524 billion shares,36 valued at over $47 billion, were traded on the
Nasdaq.37

Both U.S. stock markets experienced rapid expansion in market size in
the 1990s, growth which stalled in the new millennium as the technology
bubble burst. The aggregate number of listings on both markets fell from
1995 through 2003 and remained flat thereafter. The following chart sets
forth the number of domestic listings and aggregate domestic market
capitalization of both markets on a combined basis from 1995 through
2006.38

Chart 1A
Number of Domestic Listings and Aggregate Domestic Market
Capitalization of U.S. Markets
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During this period, the pattern of market capitalization and listings
size was different for non-U.S. issuers. The following chart sets forth the

36. Nasdaq Stock Exchange, Nasdaq Monthly Trading Data, http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/
asp/tdMarkSpec.asp?RepType= 1&cboMARDate= 12%2F1%2F2006&MARSearchDate=&View.
x=15&View.y=6 (follow "24 months" hyperlink under "Average Daily Activity") (last visited
Feb. 17, 2007).
http://www.worldTurnover,
Daily
Exchs.,
Average
Fed'n
of
37. World
exchanges.org/publications/EQUITY606.xls (last visited May 15, 2007).
38. World Fed'n of Exchs., Domestic Market Capitalization, http://www.worldexchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?action=document&menu=27 (follow "2006" hyperlink; then
follow "Equity Markets" hyperlink; then follow "Domestic Market Capitalization" hyperlink;
repeat through 1995) (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
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number of non-U.S. listings and aggregate market capitalization of nonU.S. issuers listed on the NYSE from 1995 through 2006. 39
Chart 1B
Number of Non-U.S. Listings and Aggregate Non-U.S. Market
Capitalization on the NYSE
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Chart 1B reveals the sometimes erratic growth in non-U.S. listings and
non-U.S. market capitalization of the NYSE from 1995 through 2000 and
the flat growth that has followed. This is a trend mirrored on the Nasdaq:
non-U.S. listings on the Nasdaq grew from 361 at the end of 1995 to 488 at
the end of 2000 but fell back to 321 by the end of 2006.40 Nonetheless,
when compared to Chart IA and the relatively constant decline in domestic
listings from 1995 through 2003, non-U.S. listings emerge as a key
contributor to the recent historical growth of the U.S. market.
39. World Fed'n of Exchs., Number of Listed Companies, http://www.worldexchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?menu=344&document=3356 (data for "Number of Listings"
comes from 1995 to 2006 "Number of Listed Companies" spreadsheets; data for "Market
Capitalization" comes from 1996 to 2006 "Domestic Market Capitalization" spreadsheets) (last
visited Feb. 17, 2007) (market capitalization figures unavailable for 1995).
This is the
continuation of a pre-existing trend: in 1990, there were only ninety-six non-U.S. listings on the
NYSE itself, up from fifty-four such listings in 1985. Similarly, non-U.S. listings on Nasdaq
grew from 185 in 1991 to 320 as of the end of 1995. Jonathan Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The
Economics of Stock Exchange Listing Fees and Listing Requirements, 11 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 297, 302 (2002).
40. World Fed'n of Exchs., Number of Listed Companies, http://www.worldexchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?menu=27
(follow "2006" hyperlink; then follow "Equity
Markets" hyperlink; then follow "Number of Listed Companies" hyperlink; repeat through 1995)
(last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
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The recent decline of non-U.S. listings on both U.S. markets is in part
due to the lower number of non-U.S. issuers choosing to list in the U.S.
market. The following chart sets forth the number of new non-U.S. listings
on the NYSE and Nasdaq from 1995 through 2006.4"
Chart 1C
Number of New Non-U.S. Listings on the NYSE and Nasdaq
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The decline in new non-U.S. listings shown on Chart IC is even
starker when measured by volume. For example, in 2003, thirty-one
percent of the NYSE's initial public offering volume derived from nonU.S. issuers, compared to just eight percent in 2005.42 Not only have nonU.S. issuers increasingly chosen not to list in the United States, but nonU.S. issuers already listed in the United States have, since 2001, begun to
depart from the U.S. market altogether. In the five-year period from the
end of 2001 through 2006, thirty-one issuers voluntarily chose to delist
from the NYSE.43
41. World Fed. of Exchs., Number of Listed Companies, http://www.worldexchanges.org/WFE/home.aspaction=document&menu=27 (follow "2006" hyperlink; then
follow "Equity Markets" hyperlink; then follow "Number of Newly Listed and Delisted
Companies" hyperlink; data comes from "Foreign Companies" column; repeat through 1995)
(last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
42. MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SERVICES LEADERSHIP 46 (2007) [hereinafter MCKINSEY REPORT] (report of McKinsey & Co.

on the competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets).
43. E-mail from Jean Tobin, NYSE Researcher, NYSE, to Josh Terebelo, Research Assistant
to Professor Steven M. Davidoff, Wayne State University Law School (Oct. 19, 2006, 13:31
EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Moreover, the numbers with respect to
delistings are abnormally low. The SEC adopted rules effective June 4, 2007, to permit non-U.S.
issuers to delist freely. This appears to have resulted in a significant drop in listings by non-U.S.
issuers subsequent to this date, as non-U.S. issuers who desire to delist are now able to do so. See
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Despite this downward trend, the market capitalization of non-U.S.
issuers relative to domestic issuers has increased over the last decade: as of
December 31, 2006, 38.24% of the $25 trillion total market capitalization
of the NYSE consisted of non-U.S. listings. 44 This compares with ratios of
25.2% and 30.8% at the end of 1996 and 2001, respectively.45 This
increase is primarily the result of the superior performance of the home
markets for these non-U.S. issuers compared to the U.S. market.46 Thus,
while the number of non-U.S. listings may have declined, the relative
importance of non-U.S. issuers to the U.S. investor for diversification
purposes has become more significant. Moreover, prior to this decline,
non-U.S. listings contributed an important accretive component to the U.S.
market in times of negative growth in domestic listings.
The reasons postulated for the downward trend in new non-U.S.
listings include overburdensome U.S. regulation, heightened litigation fears
in a post-Sarbanes-Oxley world, improved quality, pricing, and liquidity of
non-U.S. markets, the control by their governments of many prospective
non-U.S. issuers and their preference for a home country listing, and lower
transaction costs associated with listing in a non-U.S. market.47 Moreover,
this is a problem exacerbated by the simultaneous decline in the equity
rating premium for listing in the United States relative to other well-

Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer's Registration of a Class of Securities Under Section
12(g) and Duty To File Reports Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 72 Fed. Reg. 16,934 (Apr. 5, 2007) (to be codified as 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, and
249); see also Emily Chasan, Foreign Companies Check Out of U.S. Markets, INT'L Bus. TIMES,
available at http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20070706/sarbanes-oxleyJul. 6, 2007,
companies.htm (reporting that, since the effective date of the SEC's new deregistration rules and
as of July 7, 2007, "[a]bout 35 foreign companies have voluntarily announced plans to delist their
stocks from U.S. exchanges").
http://www.nysedata.com/nysedata/
& Figures,
Facts
Stock
Exch.,
44. N.Y.
Default.aspx?tabid=115 (follow "NYSE Historical Statistics" hyperlink; then follow "Market
Capitalization of NYSE Companies") (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
45. Id. The numbers for the Nasdaq are similar, and, as of December 31, 2006, the total
market capitalization of Nasdaq was $4.201 trillion, with six percent being the non-U.S. issuer
component. This compares with less than one percent at the end of 2001. E-mail from Alex
Garay, Researcher, NASDAQ, to Josh Terebelo, Research Assistant to Professor Steven M.
Davidoff, Wayne State University Law School (Feb. 12, 2007, 11:51 EST) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
46. It is also a result of the tendency of larger capitalized non-U.S. issuers to list on U.S.
exchanges, creating disproportional effects on U.S. markets in times when there are higher returns
on non-U.S. markets. See Marco Pagano et al., The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do
Companies List Abroad?, 57 J. FIN. 2651, 2676 (2002) (examining the characteristics of crosslisting corporate entities and finding that "cross-listing companies are significantly larger than
companies that are only listed domestically").
47. I further discuss this debate and its ramifications for regulation of non-U.S. issuers infra
notes 315-20 and accompanying text.
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regulated exchanges.48 The decline in new non-U.S. listings has likely been
caused by a combination of the above; but whatever the reasons, the
numbers reveal one certainty: since 2001, non-U.S. issuers have in some
measure failed to choose or otherwise spumed the U.S. market, depriving it
of an important growth component.
B.

Europe

The European market for listings is more fragmented than the U.S.
market. Each European Union ("E.U.") member-state has historically had
its own home country exchange on which its domestic companies almost
all uniformly chose to list.49 The increasing integration of the E.U. has
changed this landscape, resulting in a wave of consolidation among the
European exchanges. The most prominent is the merger of the Paris
Bourse, Amsterdam Stock Exchange, Brussels Stock Exchange, and
Portuguese Stock Exchange to form Euronext ° The other significant
consolidation is OMX, an agglomeration of the Nordic exchanges in
Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsinki, Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius."' Despite
this development and the increasing relative dominance of the London
Stock Exchange ("LSE") within the E.U. market, European issuers still
largely prefer to list on an exchange located in their home country. 2
The three largest E.U. exchanges, as of December 31, 2006, are the
LSE with 1,606 issuers and an aggregate domestic market capitalization of
$3.79 trillion,53 Euronext with 1,210 issuers and an aggregate domestic
market capitalization of $3.71 trillion,54 and Frankfurt's Deutsche Brrse

48. See Luigi Zingales, Is the U.S. Capital Market Losing Its Competitive Edge?, J. ECON.
PERSP. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 12), available at http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/
luigi.zingales/vita/ (finding that on average the premium for listing in both the U.S. and home
country stock markets almost halved, dropping by. 19 since 2002).
49. This home country bias is discussed further infra Part lI.B.
50. See
Euronext,
History,
http://www.euronext.com/editorial/wide/0,5371,17324427342,00.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
51. See OMX Corporate, About OMX, http://www.omxgroup.com/omxcorp/AboutOMX/
(last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
52. See Sergei Sarkissian & Michael J. Schill, The Overseas Listing Decision: New
Evidence of Proximity Preference I (Darden Grad. Sch. of Bus. Admin., Working Paper No. 0307, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=267103.
53. LONDON STOCK EXCH., MAIN MARKET FACT SHEET 16 (Dec. 2006), available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/5190CE7B-2F05-4E9F-9109-2B56 1F423D
66/0/MainMarketFactsheetDecember2006.pdf; London Stock Exch., Main Market Fact Sheet,
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/2EC93ODD-D365-42 IF-98E 1-65104EI 8F7
91/0/MainMarketFactsheetDecember2006.xls (click on "Summary" tab) (converted to U.S.
dollars at $1 = CO.7584).
54. EURONEXT, NEXT FACTS 6 (Dec. 2006), available at http://www.euronext.com
file/view/0,4245,1626_53424_1000744444,00.pdfchannelld=350260&local=1732 (converted to
U.S. dollars at $1 = E0.7584).
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with 836 issuers and an aggregate domestic market capitalization of $1.637
trillion.55 The Deutsche Borse and the LSE have thus far remained
independent; Euronext has been acquired by the NYSE. 6 Nonetheless,
there is a general consensus that there will be further significant
consolidation focusing on these two independent stock markets, and that
this process will ultimately result in two or three dominant E.U. exchanges
similar to the stock market consolidation that occurred in the United States
in the early twentieth century.57
In addition to consolidating, the European exchanges are growing in
size relative to the U.S. market. The following chart sets forth the number
of domestic issuers listed on, and aggregate domestic market capitalization
of, all E.U. stock exchanges from 1995 through 2006.58

55. DEUTSCHE BORSE GROUP, FACTS AND FIGURES 1 (Jan. 2007), available at
http://www I .deutsche-boerse.com/INTERNET/EXCHANGE/zpd.nsf/KIR+Web+Publikationen
World Fed'n of Exchs.,
/AKLS-6XGJ64/$FILEIF&FJanuar_2007_E.pdf?OpenElement;
http://www.world-exchanges.org/WFE/home.aspaction
Capitalization,
Market
Domestic
=document&menu=27 (follow "2006" hyperlink; then follow "Equity Markets" hyperlink; then
follow "Domestic Market Capitalization") (converted to U.S. dollars at $1 = C0.7584).
56. See James Kanter, Trans-Atlantic Exchange to Be Listed Today, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2007, at C2.
57. See, e.g., Norman S. Poser, The Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe:
Automation, Globalization, and Consolidation, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 497, 498 (2001)
("[Tihe European stock exchanges are rushing headlong to consolidate.").
58. World Fed'n of Exchs., Domestic Market Capitalization, http://www.worldexchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?action=document&menu=27 (for "Number of Issuers," follow
"2006" hyperlink; then follow "Equity Markets" hyperlink; then follow "Number of Listed
Companies" hyperlink; repeat through 1995) (for "Domestic Market Capitalization," follow
"2006" hyperlink; then follow "Equity Markets" hyperlink; then follow "Domestic Market
Capitalization" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) (calculations on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
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Chart 2A
Issuers and Aggregate Market Capitalization of EU Exchanges
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The growth of the E.U. market shown on Chart 2A is marked when
compared to the U.S. market.
The aggregate domestic market
capitalization of the E.U. market from 1995 through 2006 grew at an
annual rate of 12.7%, compared to 9.5% for the domestic U.S. market.5 9
The number of listings on all E.U. markets similarly increased at an annual
rate of 5.2% during this same period, compared to a net decline in domestic
listings on the U.S. market.60
The market for global equity listings, as opposed to domestic listings
in Europe, historically has been almost wholly occupied by the LSE and the
Deutsche Btrse, with the LSE the clear market leader. 61 These are also the
59. World Fed'n of Exchs., Domestic Market Capitalization, http://www.worldexchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?action=document&menu=27 (follow "2006" hyperlink"; then
follow "Equity Markets" hyperlink; then follow "Domestic Market Capitalization"; use numbers
from "Change %" column) (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) (calculations on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
60. Id.
61. Both the Luxembourg and the Amsterdam sections of Euronext trade a number of debt
and alternative investment funds of a global nature but have only a comparatively small number
of
equity
listings.
See
Euronext,
Euronext
Amsterdam
Factbook
2005,
http://www.euronext.comfilelview/0,4245,1626_53424_820575992,00.xls?channelld=20836930
8&local=1732 (disclosing that, at the end of 2005, the Amsterdam section of Euronext listed only
131 equity issues out of approximately 1,750 total securities listed); LUX. STOCK EXCH.,
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two thickest European markets, offering size and liquidity comparable to
the U.S. market. Together, as of December 31, 2006, they comprised
47.3% of the daily trading volume 62 and 33.6% of the total domestic market
capitalization on the E.U. market. 63 The following chart sets forth the
number of non-domestic listings and non-domestic market capitalization
for the LSE from 1995 through 2 0 0 6 .'
Chart 2B
Non-Domestic Listings and Non-Domestic Market Capitalization for
the London Stock Exchange
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FACTBOOK II: STATISTICS 56 (2006), http://www.bourse.lu/Accueil.jsp (follow "Statistics"
hyperlink; then select 2006 in the drop-down box next to "Factbook II Statistics"; then click
"Go!") (disclosing that, at the end of 2005, the Luxembourg Stock Exchange listed only 279
equity issues out of approximately 36,000 total securities listed).
62. Calculations by author based on material available at World Federation of Exchanges,
Number of Trading Days, Average Daily Turnover, and Average Value of Trades,
http://www.world-exchanges.orgIWFE/home.asp?menu=406&document=4140 (last visited Feb.
17, 2007).
63. Calculations by author based on material available at World Federation of Exchanges,
http://www.world-exchanges.orgfWFE/home.asp?menu=
Domestic Market Capitalization,
406&document=4140 (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
on
Members,
http://www.worldExchs.,
Statistics
Fed'n
of
64. World
(last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
exchanges.orgfWFE/home.asp?menu=378&document=3554
Information regarding market capitalization available at London Stock Exchange, Main Market
Fact Sheets, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/ (follow "About the Exchange"
hyperlink; then follow "Statistics" hyperlink; then follow "Fact Sheets" hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 18, 2007). Market capitalization data was not available for years prior to 1998.
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Chart 2B shows a different growth pattern in non-domestic listings for
the LSE than that of the U.S. market. Non-domestic listings on the LSE
have steadily declined over the period, in contrast to the growth spurt
experienced by the U.S. market from 1995 through 2001. The numbers are
even more attenuated for the Deutsche Borse: non-domestic listings
declined from 210 at the end of 1998 to 104 at the end of 2006.65
Moreover, the market capitalization of non-domestic listings on the LSE
fell in value by approximately 15.3% from 1998 to 2006.66 Thus, from
1995 through 2006, and in contrast to the U.S. market, non-domestic
listings do not appear to have been a substantial growth driver for the LSE
and the Deutsche Bbrse. Rather, the expansion of these markets appears to
have been primarily a function of an increase in domestic listings.67
These European statistics, though, do not reflect the new prominence
of the less regulated, London-based Alternative Investment Market
("AIM"). The AIM was launched by the LSE in 1995.68 It is a lightly
regulated, alternative public market established primarily as an exchange
for small, capitalized issuers. 69 The growth in the AIM has been explosive.
The AIM was founded in 1995, and by the end of that year had 121
listings. 7' Listings then increased exponentially. By December 31, 2006,
1,634 companies with an aggregate market capitalization of $177.46 billion
were listed on the AIM.7 1 In 2006 alone there were 462 new listings on the
65. World
Fed'n
of
Exchs.,
Statistics
on
Members,
http://www.worldexchanges.org/WFE/home.aspmenu=10 (follow "Annual" hyperlink; then follow "2006"
hyperlink; then follow "Equity Markets" hyperlink; then follow "Number of Listed Companies"
hyperlink; repeat for 1998) (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
66. Calculations made by author based on material available at London Stock Exchange,
Main Market Fact Sheet, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/2EC93ODD-D365421F-98E1-65104E18F791/0/MainMarketFactsheetDecember2006.xls (click on "Summary" tab
for 2006 information), and London Stock Exchange, Primary Market Fact Sheet-December
1998, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/478C90D9-AE95-4FBE-B93E-903F
4D28AA62/0/142.xls (click on "Summary" tab for 1998 information).
67. Domestic listings on the LSE grew from 1,957 listings at the end of 1998 to 2,913
listings at the end of 2006, and on the Deutsche Borse grew from 452 listings at the end of 1998
to 656 listings at the end of 2006. World Fed'n of Exchs., Number of Listed Companies,
http://www.world-exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?action=document&menu=27
(follow "1998"
hyperlink; then follow "Equity Markets" hyperlink; then follow "Number of Listed Companies"
hyperlink; repeat for 2006) (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
68. See London Stock Exchange, About AIM, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/engb/products/companyservices/ourmarkets/aimnew/About+AIM/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
69. I discuss the AIM more fully infra Part H1I.B.1.
70. London Stock Exch., AIM Market Statistics 2, http://www.londonstockexchange.
co.uk/NR/rdonlyres/C26FE728-83CE-459E-AEDB-237F3E6736E4/0/AIMStatisticsO7O .xls (last
visited Feb. 17, 2007).
71. LONDON STOCK EXCH., AIM MARKET STATISTIcS 2 (Dec. 2006), available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/B7AODF24-36E9-4EC3-AF89-9FE36AC8
BCC8/0/AimfsO6l2.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) (converted from U.K. pounds to U.S. dollars
at $1 = £0.5109).
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AIM, raising $19.46 billion in capital.72 Underlying this strong growth is a
sharp rise in the number of non-U.K companies electing to list on the AIM.
As of December 31, 2006, 306 of the companies listed on the AIM were
non-U.K. issuers.73

Additionally, in 2006 there were 124 new non-U.K.

issuer listings on the AIM, raising approximately $3.3 billion in capital,74
including nineteen U.S. issuers who opted to list on the AIM, raising
approximately $860 million.75
C.

Asia

The final leg of this tripod is Asia. The two main players here are the
Tokyo Stock Exchange ("TSE") and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange
("HKSE"). The TSE is the bigger of the two: it is the second largest stock
market in the world with 2,391 issuers and an aggregate market
capitalization of slightly more than $4.5 trillion as of December 31, 2006.76
In contrast, the HKSE had, on that same date, 1,173 issuers with an
aggregate market capitalization of $1.708 trillion. 77 As the following chart
shows, both markets have also experienced a steady rise in domestic
market capitalization in the last four years, following several years of
inconsistent growth. 8

72. Id. (converted from U.K. pounds to U.S. dollars at $1 = £0.5109).
73. Id.
74. London Stock Exch., AIM Market Statistics, http://www.londonstockexchange.co.uk/engb/about/statistics/factsheets/aimmarketstats.htm (follow "December 2006" hyperlink") (last
visited Feb. 17, 2007) (converted from U.K. pounds to U.S. dollars at $1 = £0.5109).
75. Id. (converted from U.K. pounds to U.S. dollars at $1 = £0.5109). There were thirtyeight U.S. issuers listed on the AIM at the end of 2006. See id.
76. World Fed'n of Stock Exchs., http://www.world-exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp
?action=document&menu=28 (follow "2006" hyperlink; then follow "Domestic Market
Capitalization" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) (converted from Japanese Yen to U.S.
dollars at $1 = V121.838).
77. H.K. STOCK EXCH., HKEx FACT BOOK, http://www.hkex.com.hk (follow "Data &
Statistics" hyperlink on left; then follow "HKEx Fact Book" hyperlink; then follow "listing
statistics" and "market capitalisation" hyperlinks for data) (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) (converted
from Hong Kong Dollars to U.S. dollars at $1 = HK$7.807).
78. Tokyo Stock Exch., Market Value, http://www.tse.or.jp/market/data/value/historicaljika.xls (last visited Feb. 17, 2007); H.K. STOCK EXCH., HKEX FACT BOOK,
http://www.hkex.com.hk (follow "Data & Statistics" hyperlink on left; then follow "HKEx Fact
Book" hyperlink; then follow "2006" hyperlink; then follow "market capitalisation" hyperlink)
(last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
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Chart 3A
Market Capitalization of Tokyo and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges
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As Chart 3A shows, aggregate domestic market capitalization
increased during the entire period at 3.8% annually on the TSE, compared
to a blazing seventeen percent on the HKSE, a rate of growth well ahead of
the U.S. and E.U. markets.79 Moreover, the rising presence of the HKSE is
also reflected in the public market for listings. The following chart sets
forth the number of listings on the HKSE and the TSE from 1995 through
2006.80

79. Calculations by author based on material available at Tokyo Stock Exchange, Market
Value, http://www.tse.or.jp/marketldatalvalue/historical-jika.xls (last visited Feb. 17, 2007); H.K.
STOCK EXCH., HKEx FACT BOOK, http://www.hkex.com.hk (follow "Data & Statistics"
hyperlink on left; then follow "HKEx Fact Book" hyperlink; then follow "2006" hyperlink; then
follow "market capitalisation" hyperlink; repeat through 1995) (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
80. World
Fed'n
of
Exchs.,
Statistics
on
Members,
http://www.worldexchanges.org/WFE/home.aspaction=document&menu=27 (follow "2006" hyperlink; then
follow "Equity Markets" hyperlink; then follow "Number of Listed Companies" hyperlink; repeat
through 1995) (last visited Feb 17. 2007).
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Chart 3B
Number of Listings on Tokyo and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges
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As Chart 3B shows, the HKSE is adding listings at a significantly

faster pace than the TSE: the HKSE more than doubled its number of
listings from 1995 through 2006. In the worldwide market for new listings,
the HKSE also had a robust year in 2006, with sixty-two new issuers
listing, raising $42.67 billion in market capital. 8 This compares to 104
new listings for the TSE in 2006, raising $11.88 billion.82 The HKSE's
comparative rise is largely the product of the industrialization of China
during this time period and the resulting increase in Chinese-listed
companies that have largely preferred, or been directed by the Chinese
government, to list on the HKSE.83
In contrast to the robust domestic listing market, the global listings
market is nascent in Asia, and this is reflected on both the HKSE and the

81. H.K. Stock Exch., 2006 Market Statistics, http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews
/0701122news.xls (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) (converted from Hong Kong dollars to U.S. dollars
at $1 = HK$7.807).
82. TOKYO
STOCK
EXCH.,
MAIN
BOARD
MONTHLY
REPORT
5
(2006)
http://www.tse.or.jp/english/listing/companies/statistics-12-y2006.pdf;
Tokyo Stock Exch.,
Financing by Listed Companies, http://www.tse.or.jp/english/market/data/financing/index.html
(last visited May 17, 2007) (converted from Japanese Yen to U.S. dollars at $1 = Y121.838).
83. Mainland Chinese companies accounted for half of the market capitalization of the
HKSE in 2006, compared to only sixteen percent in 1997. H.K. Stock Exch., 2006 Market
Statistics 19-23, http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/0701122news.xls (last visited Feb. 17,
2007). In addition, mainland Chinese companies accounted for fifteen percent of the HKSE's
total listings in 1997, compared to thirty-one percent in 2006. Id. at 22-23.
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TSE. As of December 31, 2006, there were only eight non-domestic
issuers listed on the HKSE, compared to twenty-five non-domestic issuers
on the TSE.' 4 Despite this, the HKSE is currently pegged as an emerging
competitor, and Asia's best candidate, in the global listings market. This is
due to the rising competitive status of the market, a product of Hong
Kong's status as Asia's financial center, and its ability to attract listings by
The HKSE's
Chinese domestic companies with global profiles.85
competitive stature is likely to increase as the Chinese market continues to
blessings of the Chinese
grow and the HKSE itself continues to receive the
86
government as its preferred global stock market.
D.

The Global Market

The U.S. market is still the premier market in the world. As of
December 31, 2006, it comprised forty-three percent of aggregate world
domestic stock market capitalization and forty-five percent of aggregate
world trading volume.87 There were also 228 initial public offerings on the
U.S. markets in 2006, raising approximately $46.1 billion.88 Moreover, it
appears that talk of the U.S. market's comparative decline in the global
listings market may be overstated. The oft-cited fall in non-U.S. listings
from 2002 through 2006 has coincided with an even more substantial,
extended decline in non-domestic listings on European markets.8 9
Meanwhile, the Asian markets have not made any significant entry into the
global market for listings during this time period.9"
84. World Fed'n of Stock Exchs., Number of Listed Companies 2006, http://www.worldexchanges.org/publications/EQUITY306.XLS (last visited Feb. 17, 2007). The TSE actually lost
absolute market share for non-domestic listings in the period from 1990 to 2006; the number of
non-domestic issuers listing on this market has dropped from seventy-seven non-domestic listings
in 1995 to twenty-five as of December 31, 2006. Id. (2006 statistic); World Fed'n of Stock
Shares,
http://www.world-exchanges.org
Exchs.,
Number
of
Companies
with
/publicationsfTal 196.xls (last visited Feb. 17 2007) (1995 statistic).
85. See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Hong Kong Set to Be No. I in 2006 Offerings, Surpassing
London and New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006, at C4 (reporting on the growing international
prominence of the HKSE).
86. See Erica Fung, Regulatory Competition in International Capital Markets: Evidence
from China in 2004-2005, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 243, 274-75 (2006) (discussing the influence of
the Chinese government on listing decisions by mainland Chinese companies).
87. Calculations by author based on material available at World Federation of Exchanges,
Domestic
Market
Capitalization,
http://www.world-exchanges.org/publications/
EQUITY106.XLS (last visited Feb. 17, 2006), and World Federation of Exchanges, Average
Amount of Daily Turnover, http://www.world-exchanges.org/publications/EQUITY606.xls (last
visited Feb. 17, 2006). More specifically, aggregate world trading volume in 2006 was $5.775
billion, of which the NYSE and Nasdaq combined comprised $2.582 billion. Id.
88. See Rob Garver, An IPO Resurgence?, CFO MAG., Feb. 1, 2007, at 13, availableat 2007
WLNR 2367286.
89. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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There are signs, however, that do raise concern. The growth in nonU.S. listings on the U.S. market appears to have stagnated after a period of
sustained rise, and a number of currently listed non-U.S. issuers have
chosen to exit the U.S. market. 9 Moreover, the European and Asian
markets offer increasingly credible alternatives to the U.S. market. These
non-U.S. markets have been able to leverage this position and capture an
increasing share of the global market for capital. For example, in 2005,
352 companies issued equity outside their home markets for the first time,
raising a total of $92 billion.92 Only six percent of this equity, or $4.6
billion, was raised on the U.S. public markets. 93 This compares to 2000,
when approximately half of global capital was obtained on the U.S.
market. 94 Even more tellingly, nineteen of the twenty largest global
offerings in 2005 chose not to list in the United States.95
Moreover, the bulk of offering activity occurred in just two
jurisdictions: the London markets and the HKSE. In 2006, issuers making
initial public offerings raised $46.9 billion on the AIM and the LSE9 6 and
$42.76 billion on the HKSE.9 7 The AIM in particular is a controversial
market. It has come under criticism for low returns, high volatility,
illiquidity, and scandalous practices by its listed issuers. 98 However, it and
the HKSE have become leading markets for new listings.99 For example,
post-Sarbanes-Oxley, there has been a sevenfold increase in non-domestic
listings on the AIM.'
Moreover, these and other non-U.S. markets,

91. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. See generally INTERIM CAPITAL
MARKETS REPORT, supra note 1, at 29-34 (asserting that the U.S. market has recently declined in
relative competitiveness to foreign markets).
92. INTERIM CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT, supra note 1,at 29.
93. Id. See also Zingales, supra note 48, at 6 (finding that the U.S. market share for global
initial public offerings went from fifty percent in 2000 to ten percent in 2005 if Chinese, Indian,
and Russian offerings are excluded).
94. Zingales, supra note 48, at 2.
95. ERNST & YOUNG, ACCELERATING GROWTH: GLOBAL IPO TRENDS 4 (2006), available
at http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/Intemational/IPO_-_GlobalIPOSurvey-2006/$file/
E&Y- SGM-GloballPOSurvey2006.pdf.
96. London
Stock
Exch.,
Statistics,
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/
about/statistics/ (for LSE statistic, follow "Main Market Statistics" hyperlink; then follow "2006"
hyperlink; for AIM statistic, follow "AIM statistics"; then follow "2006" hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 17, 2007) (converted from U.K. pounds to U.S. dollars at $1 = £0.5109).
97. H.K. Stock Exch., 2006 Market Statistics 3, http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/
hkexnews/0701122news.xls (last visited Feb. 2, 2007) (converted from Hong Kong Dollars to
U.S. dollars at $1 = HK$7.807).
98. See infra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
99. See Fung, supra note 86, at 245 ("Hong Kong has become a very substantial regional
market in its own right, possessing the liquidity to support most of the large IPOs coming out of
China.").
100. Piotroski & Srinivasan, supra note 3, at 4.
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particularly the LSE, are likely to continue to gain traction, building critical
mass and volume as their domestic capital markets grow.
This global non-U.S. activity should be contextualized, though, as it
occurs in a market where competition for the primary listing of issuers has
historically been absent. More specifically, almost all issuers traditionally
choose to have their primary listing in their home jurisdiction.'
The
market for issuers in developed nations is still one for cross-listings. 0 2
These are issuers who have their primary listing in their home market but
choose to cross-list on another market rather than make their primary
listing abroad. Even then, a recent study found that fewer than ten percent
of eligible issuers were cross-listed.'0 3 In large measure, this explains the
success of non-U.S. markets in the past few years. The non-U.S. markets'
new prominence in initial listings can largely be attributed to the increasing
competitiveness of these markets and a timely comparative rise in domestic
capital markets activity rather than any defect in the U.S. market." But,
where before these issuers chose to cross-list on the U.S. market, they no
longer elect to do so.
The rapid industrialization of many developing countries may also
relax this home country listing tendency. For example, in 2006, fourteen
issuers from developing countries, primarily from the CIS region' 5 and
1 6
India, raised an aggregate amount of $14.43 billion in capital on the LSE.
07
Each of these issuers made the LSE their primary market when listing.
This is a trend likely to continue globally in other markets. The number of
issuers from developing countries who choose to make their primary listing
outside their home market is likely to increase as these countries gain
economic strength but the development of local institutions does not keep
pace. Yet, this is a development limited to issuers in industrializing nations
101. See infra Part II.B.
102. See Coffee, supra note 15, at 1770-79 (outlining the parameters of the global listings

market).
103. See Craig Doidge et al., Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, 71 J.
FIN. ECON. 205, 216 (2004).
104. See supra Parts I.B.& I.C.
105. CIS stands for Commonwealth of Independent States, a loose confederation of nations
formerly comprising the U.S.S.R.
106. London
Stock
Exch.,
Main
Market
Fact
Sheet-December
2006,
http://www.londonstockexchange.comNRlrdonlyres/2EC93ODD-D365-42IF-98E 1-65104E 18F7
91/0/MainMarketFactsheetDecember2006.xls (click on "T8 Co's by value" tab); London Stock
Exch., AIM Market Statistics-December 2006, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/
NR/rdonlyres/B7C 12B02- IC60-4B61-8271-33667EBA5D34/0/AimfsO612.xls (click on "Co's by
value" tab).
107. Here, the issuers may have kept a token listing for regulatory or political reasons in their
home market but have made it publicly clear that their LSE listing is their primary one. In any
event, I consider this a de facto primary listing due to the often substantially lower regulatory
standards applied in their home market.
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and not mirrored in developed nations. Thus, the market for global listings
in the near future is likely to be two submarkets: one for cross-listings of
issuers sited in developed countries and one for primary listings of issuers
from industrializing countries.
The market for listings is a global one that has become increasingly
competitive. Dominant players are emerging in both Asia and Europe who
offer a realistic alternative to the U.S. market. This appears to be a natural
result of the maturation of the U.S. market, as well as the development and
quicker growth in Asia and Europe." 8 The competitive position of the
United States also seems to be at a weak point; the United States is seen by
many as an overregulated market where the reward for listing-a higher
equity premium-and lower cost of capital may be adversely affected in a
post-Sarbanes-Oxley world."°9 Meanwhile, as will be discussed in Part III,
foreign stock markets currently offer a more differentiated and competitive
regulatory product. This advantage is demonstrated by the decline in the
number of non-U.S. issuers choosing to list or maintain a listing in the
United States, and it is of particular import because non-domestic listings
have historically been a source of growth for the U.S. market."0 Not
surprisingly, this state of affairs has stirred a fierce debate in the United
States as to the cause and remedy for this and other perceived declines.
This debate touches on the larger issue of the proper scope of U.S.
regulation in competitive global capital markets."' Part II seeks to better
understand this debate by setting forth the relevant interests of the main
actors in the global market for listings.
II. THE ACTORS IN THE GLOBAL LISTINGS MARKET
Four of the principal actors in the global listings market are investors,
issuers, regulators, and stock markets. The relevant interests of each of
these actors are diverse and sometimes divergent. This Part lays out these
material interests. The goal is still to establish a principled norm for U.S.
regulation of non-U.S. issuers, one that both increases the competitiveness
of the U.S. market and is premised upon the particularized needs of these
primary actors.
A.

Investors

Modem finance theory teaches that the goal of rational investors
should be twofold. First, investors should expect a return commensurate
108. See supra note 96-104.
109. See supra note 6; see also INTERIM CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT, supra note 1, at 47-48.
110. See supra Part I.A.

111. For a further discussion of this debate, see infra Part IV.D.
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with the risk taken in relation to their particular investments.' 2 Second,
investors should sufficiently diversify investments in order to avoid, to the
fullest extent possible, idiosyncratic risk." 3 This is a norm; investors are
not drones, but rather people with their own individual heuristics and
cognitive psyches." 4 Put another way, different investors may, in practice,
diverge from the theoretically optimal approach. For example, an investor
may wish to invest all of his or her money in a "sure-thing" Internet stock
tip (as told to him or her by a next-door neighbor)." 5 But modern
investment theory cannot control investors; it merely sets out an optimal
investment according to risk and
strategy for these investors:
diversification. The ultimate goal is for all to make money.
Diversification is a multifaceted affair. It is global in nature and
extends beyond any particular asset class." 6 Again, if one turns to modem
portfolio theory, the rational investor should invest globally in order to
achieve full diversification in equity markets. 17 The optimal equity
investment portfolio will contain a sufficient number of stocks to mirror the
global market, thereby hedging as much as possible against idiosyncratic
risk." 8 If investors want to earn a rate of return higher or lower than the
market risk associated with this diversified global portfolio, they can then
leverage or deleverage their portfolio to adjust their risk." 9 This is the
112. See RICHARD A. BREARLY, STEWART C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 194-95 (8th ed. 2006) (discussing the relationship between investment risk
and return: investors expect a higher or lower return commensurate with the risk-level of an
investment).
113. The goal is to minimize the standard deviation of portfolio returns by selecting
investments that do not, to the greatest extent possible, move in correlation to each other. See
Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 79 (1952) ("There is a rule which implies
both that the investor should diversify and that he should maximize expected return.").
114. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A
BehavioralApproach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135, 143-48 (2003) (reviewing
evidence of cognitive bias by investors and its effect on market prices).
115. I am alluding here to the recent technology stock bubble of 1999-2001, a prominent real
See generally ROBERT SCHILLER, IRRATIONAL
and recent example of this occurrence.
EXUBERANCE (2005) (finding investor behavior irrationally affected market prices during the
period 1999-2001).
116. EDWIN J. ELTON ET AL., MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS
276 (7th ed. 2007) ("[I]nternational diversification is justified even if expected returns are less
internationally than domestically.").
117. Global diversification provides a hedge against exchange rate movements as well as
domestic economic and other localized events. See H.G. Grubel, Internationally Diversified
Portfolios: Welfare Gains and CapitalFlows, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 1299, 1311-13 (1968).
118. ELTON ET AL., supra note 116, at 258-63. Idiosyncratic risk is risk specific to an
investment as opposed to market-wide risk. See Markowitz, supra note 113, at 89 (theorizing that
an optimal investment position is in diversified, rather than industry-specific, assets).
119. See William F. Sharpe, CapitalAsset Prices With and Without Negative Holdings, 46 J.
FIN. 489, 500 (1991) ("When a riskless asset is available, the only negative holdings in
equilibrium will involve borrowing by investors ... ").
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theoretically optimal course, but, once again, it remains largely that; the
majority of individual investors do not own a diversified global portfolio,
and their investments are instead domestically concentrated.2"
So where do the interests of investors lie at this crossroads of reality
and theory? One irreducible commonality exists in this divergence:
investors as a group prefer to pick and choose their investments and to
12
exercise that choice among the widest array of possible investments. '
They can then select a preferred investment strategy based upon their own
goals, biases, education, risk tolerance, and other self-selected factors. This
desire spans the globe: investors want investment choice beyond the
domestic arena in order to obtain maximum flexibility to select the risk,
potential return, and diversification of their portfolio.1 22 Investment choice
is thus a primary interest of investors, while diversification in exercising
that choice is the optimal recommended approach.
Investors want choice, but they also wish to invest on an informed
basis. Investors, therefore, have an interest in the disclosure of sufficient
information concerning their investments. 23 Yet, information being a
public good, investors may disagree as to the desired level of public
disclosure. 24 For example, a sophisticated investor might actually prefer a
minimal disclosure regime. In such a market, the sophisticated investor
120. One 1991 study found that U.S. investors held approximately ninety-four percent of their
investments in domestic U.S. securities. Kenneth R. French & James M. Poterba, International
Diversification and InternationalEquity Markets, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 222, 222 (1991). More
recent numbers suggest that this bias persists but is deteriorating. See Linda L. Tesar & Ingrid M.
Werner, The Internationalizationof Securities Markets Since the 1987 Crash, in BROOKINGSWHARTON PAPERS ON FINANciAL SERVICES 281, 284 (R. Litan & A. Santomero eds., 1998)
(assessing evidence of asset prices, portfolio holdings, and capital flows to find that the world is
"moving, albeit gradually, toward a more integrated financial system"). The reasons for this
continuing bias undoubtedly include capital markets barriers, although finance theorists suspect
that there are a number of other unknown variables driving this behavior. See Marianne Baxter &
Jermann Urban, The International Diversification Puzzle Is Worse Than You Think, 87 AM.
EcON. REv. 170, 170 (1997); Raman Uppal, The Economic Determinantsof the Home Country
Bias in Investors' Portfolios: A Survey, 4 J. INT'L FIN. MGT. & ACCT. 171, 171-75 (1992).
121. See Tamir Agmon & Donald R. Lessard, Investor Recognition of Corporate
International Diversification, 32 J. FIN. 1049, 1049 (1977) ("If there were no barriers to
international capital flows, and if capital markets were uniformly well developed [sic], investors
would diversify their portfolio holdings internationally ....
122. See ELTON ET AL., supra note 116, at 263-70.
123. There is a vigorous debate on the need for mandatory disclosure in order to produce a
socially optimal amount of such information, but all generally agree on the need for such
information. Instead, their dispute concerns whether the information should be disclosed as a
product of market or regulatory forces. Compare John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failureand the
Economic Case for a Mandatory DisclosureSystem, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 745 (1984) (arguing the
economic necessity of mandatory disclosure) with Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice
in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 86-91 (proposing an optional form of
regulatory regime in which issuers could choose their preferred disclosure level).
124. The current debate concerning the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a trenchant example.
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will have an advantage because he or she will have greater resources to find
and analyze otherwise undisclosed information. The investor can then earn
25
abnormal returns by investing in these mispriced investments.
Conversely, retail investors do not have such resources and therefore
generally prefer a regime of higher required public disclosure, or a welldeveloped analyst regime, so that they do not have to bear significant
information-gathering costs. 126 Again, in the divergence is a commonality.
All investors desire sufficient information to be made available to them or
the market; it is only the level of public availability of this information to
others that they may disagree upon.'27

Investors also desire a legal regime which permits effective
enforcement of their rights. The scope and parameters of such a regime are
debatable and likely to be disputed by other actors. From an investor
perspective, though, they are likely to coalesce around an agreed kernel of
fair and efficient adjudication, the ability to enforce obtained judgments,
and a strong regulator that will enforce investor rights.'28 As for the rights
themselves, their exact scope is also debatable. In the Western world,
though, we can discern some universal norms.'29

Equity investors

125. See generally PETER D. SPENCER, THE STRUCTURE AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS 1-22 (2000) (discussing the incentive effects of asymmetric information in public

markets).
126. See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 819
(2006) ("Mandatory disclosure reduces search and information processing costs for investors by
requiring cheap, readily available, standardized, and relatively reliable disclosure of
information.").
127. Investors would then either review the information themselves or rely upon such
information to be encapsulated in an efficient or semi-efficient market. But see generally Troy A.
Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003) (considering the phenomenon of information overload
and its implications for securities regulation and a mandatory disclosure scheme).
128. See, e.g., John Fagan, The Role of Securities Regulation in the Development of the Thai
Stock Market, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 303, 330-32 (2003) (describing the role of investor demand
for law and law enforcement as driving stock market regulation).
129. These can most prominently be gleaned from the variety of governmental and nongovernmental organizational reports which discuss and cite these norms. A prominent example is
a report containing the corporate governance standards pronounced by the Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development ("OECD") and the country-by-country benchmarking
program established by the World Bank against these standards.
See generally OECD
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004) [hereinafter OECD PRINCIPLES REPORT],
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf (presenting the OECD principles
of corporate governance and providing commentary on them); Bernard S. Black, The Legal and
Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001)
(proposing cure legal protections necessary for a sufficiently strong securities market); The World
Bank
Group,
Reports
on
the
Observance
of
Standards
&
Codes,
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc-cg.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) (describing the World
Bank program). There is a similar project for disclosure standards by the International
Organization of Securities Commissions, which released a set of non-financial disclosure
standards in 1998. See generally INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, INTERNATIONAL DISCLOSURE
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generally have the right to nominate and elect representatives, vote on
select decisions, and enjoy minority protection. 3 ° These rights can
generally be distilled into investors' desire for rights sufficient to protect
their investment and structure agency relationships to ensure that
management acts appropriately on their behalf."' Against this desire must
be balanced investor needs to provide management with sufficient latitude
to operate the issuer properly and to take appropriate business risks.'32 In
the balance of the two, one derives the minimum rights investors ought to
require before investing.
Finally, investors generally desire efficient capital markets.'33
Efficient capital markets for investor purposes are those which restrict
insider trading and are thick and transparent.134 "Thickness" is another
term for markets with a high volume of trading activity. High volume is a
predicate to market efficiency: investors can not only buy and sell
investments easily but can also obtain and receive better prices on such
sales and purchases due to narrower bid-ask spreads resulting from such
volume. 3 5 Transparent markets are those in which investors have the
ability to see the best price in the market and to execute trades quickly on

STANDARDS FOR CROSS-BORDER OFFERINGS AND INITIAL LISTINGS BY FOREIGN ISSUERS

(1998), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf[IOSCOPD81.pdf (containing the
international disclosure standards promulgated by the International Organization of Securities
Commissions).
130. See OECD PRINCIPLES REPORT, supra note 129, at 33 (stating that these rights are "the
most basic rights of shareholders, which are recognised [sic] by law in virtually all OECD
countries").
131. See Bernard Black, The Core Institutions That Support Strong Securities Markets, 55
BUS. LAW. 1565, 1565 (2000) (arguing that a fundamental prerequisite for strong public
securities markets is the "confidence that the company's insiders (its managers and controlling
shareholders) won't cheat investors out of most or all of the value of their investment").
132. This is the fundamental tension underlying Berle and Means' now-legendary
observations concerning the separation of ownership from stockholder control. See ADOLF A.
BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE PROPERTY 6
(Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932).
133. Again, there may be sophisticated investors who desire inefficient markets in order to
advantage themselves of investment opportunities, but they do not comprise the general
consensus.
134. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 27, at 268-71 (discussing the global trend
towards prohibition of insider trading).
135. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 571-72 (1984) (attributing trading volume as a force in assuring "the market's
rapid assimilation into price of most routine information"); Paul G. Mahoney, Market
Microstructure and Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 541, 543-46 (2003) (discussing the role of
intermediaries and trading volume in an efficient market).
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that price.' 36 This is yet another way for investors to ensure that they
receive the best price available in the market.
The relevant interests of investors in the global market for listings can
thus be summarized as a desire for global investment choice, information
availability, effective legal regimes, sufficient protective rights, and
efficient capital markets. If these interests are bundled together, they
become the bare minimum standard desired by investors for the regulation
of issuers and markets. From a rational investor viewpoint, any regulatory
regime should encapsulate these standards and characteristics in order to
promote and protect their interests. While investors may have different
preferences beyond these bare-bones standards, rational public investors
are generally aligned in desiring these fundamental building blocks as the
basis for issuer and stock market regulation. 37
B.

Issuers

In theoretically perfect capital markets, the interests of issuers with
respect to their listings would be aligned with those of their investors.
Issuers would desire to and would list on those markets that supplied the
socially optimal level of regulation, that is, the amount of regulation
desired by their investors.138 Issuers would be incentivized to engage in
this behavior because this measure of regulation would provide a higher
equity premium on their securities and lower their cost of capital.' 39 In
such theoretically perfect markets, issuers would then migrate across the
globe seeking this optimal level of regulation, monitoring and changing
their listings in response to market regulatory developments. 4 ' This is the
logical basis for Professor Romano's argument for regulatory portability. 4 '
42
This theory is not borne out in the current market for global listings. 1
Rather, a number of barriers exist in today's capital markets that
collectively work to prevent the market from functioning in this
theoretically efficient manner. The first of these barriers is the path

136. See James R. Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in an
Internationalized Marketplace, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 77, 80-81 (1992) (highlighting the
importance of market transparency in efficient markets).
137. To the extent someone would argue another higher right should be on this list, I discuss
this further in the parameters of setting a regulatory norm for non-U.S. issuers infra Part V.B.
138. See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 9, at 2366.
139. Id.
140. See Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 9, at 389-92.
141. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
142. See Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities
Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999-Part 1, 56 Bus. LAW. 653, 655 (2001) (finding that
"[i]ssuers from less well-regulated European jurisdictions do not seem to be taking advantage of
the issuer choice provisions of the E.U. law").
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dependency of the global listings market.'4 3 Issuers start life as private
companies. As such, they usually come to the listings market with their
jurisdiction of organization, accountants, and legal and other advisors
chosen. For private companies in developed countries, these are almost
always located in their home market; this is, after all, the market they are
most accustomed to operating in and wherein they have typically raised
their initial capital.' These prior choices and simple familiarity lead to a
strong tendency for issuers in developed countries to list in their home
market. 145 Moreover, once an issuer chooses to list in its home market,
there can be barriers to relocating this listing. For example, there are
transaction costs associated with any such move, including legal costs,
taxes, costs associated with any required shareholder vote, and costs
associated with the hiring and training of internal and external advisors to
comply with a new legal regime. 146 Thus, issuers not only tend to list in
47
their home country market initially, but they tend to remain listed there.
These biases may also be mutually reinforced by a similar cultural
tendency among investors to weigh the proximity of a listing in their
favoring investment in domestic, as opposed to
investment decisions,
48
issuers.
foreign,
The second barrier is a related cultural one. Issuers come to market
with built-in cultural heuristics derived from their prior experiences in their

143. Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 157-62 (1999) (discussing path dependency
and the political economy of corporate regulation).
144. This locality effect is evidenced by studies which have revealed a strong bias among
U.S. domestic corporations to organize under the laws of the state where they are headquartered.
See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1574
(2002) ("[T]he gravitational pull of a firm's home state is so strong that only about 5% of all
firms that incorporate outside of Delaware make it anywhere else.").
145. See Sarkissian & Schill, supra note 52, at 5-14 (surveying the academic literature on the
home country bias of investing and the listing decision).
146. See Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: From U.S. Corporate CharterCompetition to
Issuer Choice in InternationalSecurities Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525, 562 (2005); see also
Bebchuck & Roe, supra note 143, at 163 (stating that transnational reincorporations "will usually
carry with them significant tax, regulatory, or other economic consequences").
147. There has yet to be a comprehensive study of the frequency and magnitude of issuer
relistings in the developed world, but anecdotal evidence reveals that this is a truly rare
occurrence exemplified by the substantial worldwide publicity surrounding News Corporation's
reincorporation and movement of its primary listing from Australia to the United States. See
Geraldine Fabrikant, News Corp. Plans to Follow Its Chief to the United States, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
7, 2004, at C1.
148. See generally Richard Portes & H61ne Rey, The Determinants of Cross-Border Equity
Flows: The Geography of Information (Ctr. for Int'l Dev. & Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
COO-111, 2000), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cider/COO-Ill/ (examining the
tendency of investors to weigh negatively distance in their investment decisions and exhibiting a
gravity model whereby they tend to favor local investment choices).
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home market. These include basic cultural inputs such as language, as well
as more sophisticated cultural mores such as methods of interacting and
interpreting applicable laws and customs.'49 For example, a German issuer
listing in Japan would not only have to transact in a different language, but
also would have to interpret and act under laws and customs with which it
is inexperienced and may find difficult to rationalize, respond to, and
comply with, thereby raising transaction costs for such listing above a
suitable threshold. 5 ° Thus, issuers tend to list in familiar cultural
markets-again, their home market-in order to mitigate these
difficulties.'

The law and other listing rules may also pose an economically
inefficient burden or otherwise influence an issuer's decision to list or
remain listed. For example, listings standards and securities regulation
governing a particular market historically have been crafted to regulate
issuers organized within that jurisdiction without due regard to nondomestic issuers.'52 Thus, the listing standards of the Deutsche Borse are
drafted primarily to regulate German companies and their unique attributes,
not American companies that have different characteristics.' 53 Under
simple public choice theory, issuers may therefore prefer to list in their
home markets in order to obtain seamless, efficient regulation, and a
greater ability to influence and interact with regulators.' 5 4 Moreover, the
149. See generally Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a CrossCultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 (2001) (arguing the
importance of culture to corporate governance systems and the need to account for these crosscultural differences in analyzing corporate law).
150. See Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate
Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 195, 231-32 (2004) [hereinafter Licht, Legal PlugIns] (arguing that "[tihe theory and preliminary evidence on cultural emphases and cultural
distance [point out] the magnitude of potential resistance by receiving countries, or corporations,
to foreign legal elements").
151. These factors likely explain, in part, the low number of issuers who actually do make
their primary listing in an alternative jurisdiction and, when doing so, why they list in culturally
familiar jurisdictions. See generally Marco Pagano et al., What Makes Stock Exchanges Succeed?
Evidence from Cross-Listing Decisions, 45 EUR. ECON. REV. 770 (2001) (empirical study of ten
European exchanges finding that issuers have a tendency to cross-list in culturally similar
jurisdictions).
152. This is predictable regulatory theory: regulators have strong public interest incentives to
design a regime catering to domestic issuers without regard to foreign issuers. Cf. Fox, Retaining
Mandatory Securities Disclosure,supra note 14, at 1407 (arguing that "among issuers worldwide,
a major portion of the dispersion in their socially optimal levels of disclosure is explained by their
nationalities").
153. See Mark I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings:
Analysis of JurisdictionalApproaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207,
210-24 (1999) (examining the comparative differences between German and U.S. securities
laws).
154. Public choice theory would predict that issuers would want to list in such jurisdictions;
this is where their influence and political capital would be greatest. Cf. John C. Coates IV,
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law can make it prohibitively difficult for issuers to list outside their home
market, or to transfer from the home market to a foreign one. The principal
offender here is the United States. U.S. securities laws make it quite
difficult for domestic issuers to list outside the United States without an
domestic issuers to delist once they have
accompanying U.S. listing and for 155
decided to list in the United States.
A final barrier arises from rent seeking by issuer management.
Decisions of when and where to list are typically made by management of
the issuer. 5 6 Yet management's interests may sometimes be misaligned
with those of investors and the issuer. For example, management may
choose to list the issuer on a less regulated market in order to engage in
practices to their own personal benefit that would not otherwise be
permitted on an optimally regulated market.'57 Investors may then fail to
put a stop to these practices due to collective action problems or other
agency cost issues.'58 The result is that management may not always be
incentivized and so may not choose the optimal regulatory listing for an
issuer. Thus, even if the other three barriers did not exist and regulatory
portability was a reality, issuers might still list on suboptimal regulatory
markets due to managerial opportunism and rent seeking.
These barriers combine to push the market for global listings into a
divergent paradigm rather than the theoretically efficient one. This is the
current market reality where issuers list primarily in their home markets
and stay listed there. The one principal exception to this reality is for
issuers in developing countries. For them, the need for sufficient legal
protections, the significantly higher equity premium, and the lower cost of
capital resulting from listing in other markets increasingly overcomes the
aforementioned barriers.' 5 9 Thus, these issuers establish their primary
Privatevs. PoliticalChoice of Securities Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J.
INT'L L. 531, 565-80 (2001) (discussing the political forces trending U.S. issuers against issuer
choice in the domestic U.S. market).
155. See Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment
Theory of Mandatory Disclosure,23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 684 (2002) (outlining the difficulties
faced by a non-U.S. issuer wishing to delist from the U.S. markets). As previously discussed
supra note 43, the SEC has recently adopted rules relaxing the delisting prohibitions for nondomestic issuers.
156. See Prentice, supra note 14, at 1219-20.
157. See James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities Laws in the Shadow of International
Regulatory Competition, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 165-77 (1992) (examining the scope
of managerial opportunism in choosing regulatory regimes).
158. See, e.g., Licht, Managerial Opportunism, supra note 15, at 344-47 (observing
managerial rent seeking in the context of the structuring of Israeli securities regulation).
159. The deficiencies and effects of underregulated securities markets have been welldocumented. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law
in the Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 335-37 (2003) (examining
the role of law and associated network effects in establishing strong securities markets).
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listing on a non-domestic market. In this situation, there is no real
difference in the interests of either type of issuer. Both rationally express a
preference for a jurisdiction where there are sufficient legal protections in
order to obtain a higher equity rating and lower cost of capital. The
difference is simply that the importance of this requirement is sometimes
enough in developing nations to overcome the barriers to a non-domestic
primary listing."

In contrast, issuer interests in the market for cross-listings are
different. Traditionally, it was hypothesized that issuers cross-listed in
order to raise otherwise unavailable capital, tap into non-domestic pools of
trading liquidity, raise foreign shareholdings and their international profile,
and facilitate takeover transactions. 6 ' More recent scholarship has posited
that cross-listing is an exercise in cross-bonding, in which non-domestic
issuers cross-list in order to avail themselves of higher regulation and a
correspondingly higher equity rating and lower cost of capital.'
The
reality with respect to cross-listings is that any such choice to cross-list is
probably based on a combination of these reasons and likely correlated
with an issuer's market capitalization.'63 The decision whether to cross-list
is a choice that will be made by management who will weigh these benefits
against the detriment, if any, of additional regulation." 4 It is here again
that inefficiencies creep into the process. Management may not correctly
perceive the benefits versus the detriments, or may find substantial
benefits, but do not want to be subject to additional regulation that may
personally and adversely affect them. This is again a problem of
65
managerial opportunism. 1
Thus, the markets for primary listings and cross-listings are both
subject to the barriers, path dependencies, transaction and agency costs, and
160. This is a main pillar in the argument that cross-listings are effected primarily for bonding
purposes. Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, Cost of Capital Effects and Changes in Growth
Expectations Around U.S. Cross-Listings 3 (ECGI-Finance Working Paper No. 46/2004, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938230 (finding cross-listing by non-U.S. issuers on U.S.
exchanges results in an "economically significant and sustained decrease" in their cost of capital,
an effect which is "larger for firms from countries with weaker institutional structures").
161. See Licht, Cross-Listing, supra note 15, at 143-45 (tracing the historical development of
theories of cross-listing).
162. The originator and leading proponent of this theory is Professor Coffee. See Coffee,
supra note 15, at 1763.
163. 1 discuss the role of market capitalization as a driver in the cross-listing decision infra
Part IV.A.
164. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
165. Professor Licht has asserted that these inefficiencies dominate the listing decision,
making it an act of management avoidance and opportunism rather than one taken in the interests
of the issuer or its stockholders. See Licht, Legal Plug-Ins, supra note 150, at 205 ("A sober
analysis, especially of recent unpublished studies, indicates that the bonding hypothesis does not
receive support from the extant empirical evidence while the avoiding hypothesis does.").
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other inefficiencies that affect the ability of issuers to choose their listing
market effectively. And while the theoretical norm is the optimal one, it
appears unachievable in light of the substantial and enduring nature of the
present barriers. Moreover, the aggregate effect of these externalities is to
make the listing process unique for each individual issuer. Each issuer will
have its own different interests and approach depending upon its
individualized status. For primary listings, these characteristics should
almost always push the issuer into a listing in its home market.
Conversely, the individualized nature of each issuer's decision to cross-list
makes it difficult to draw any blanket prescriptive norm for when issuers
should or will cross-list. As will be discussed further in Part IV, this
difficulty is also a regulatory problem: in light of the idiosyncratic and
unpredictable needs of issuers in the cross-listing market, regulators may
consequently be unable to competitively promulgate one-size-fits-all
regulation to meet the needs of all potential cross-listing issuers.
C. Regulators
The interests of investors and issuers are increasingly global in nature,
but the interests of securities regulators still tend to be local. Regulators
are first and foremost creatures of their organic promulgating statute. This
statute instructs them as to the interests for which they regulate, and
typically this mandate extends only to the protection of the regulator's
domestic market and the actors therein. 66 Developments outside the
regulator's home market are not within this statutory compass. The result
is that regulators often do not view the recruitment and maintenance of
non-domestic listings as an interest to be accounted for. 167 Rather, their
goal is to regulate within their organic statute and to protect their home
markets and actors; whether this regulation produces more or fewer non-

166. For example, the Securities Act of 1933 requires that whenever the SEC is engaged in
rulemaking in the public interest, it is also required to "consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation." 15
U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2000).
167. The use of the term "regulator" here and the discussion in this subpart does not include
stock exchanges which often act as quasi-regulators or full regulators in their jurisdiction and
have separate, differing interests, discussed infra at Part II.D. Cf. INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS,
REGULATORY ISSUES ARISING FROM EXCHANGE EVOLUTION, FINAL REPORT 5 (2006), available
at http://www.iosco.orgIlibrary/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD225.pdf (describing the regulatory
functions of stock exchanges). Additionally, in small domestic markets, a regulator may have
different incentives causing it to be more hospitable to foreign listings. For example, the
Australian Stock Exchange actually encourages U.S. issuers to offer their securities and list in
See AUSTL. SECURITIES EXCH., U.S.
Australia without an accompanying U.S. listing.
COMPANIES-REGULATION S OFFERINGS ON ASX 1-4 (2004), http://www.asx.com.au/Listing
Rules/guidance/gn07-us-companies-regulation-s-offerings.pdf.
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domestic listings is not a concern. 68 Thus, regulators often do not regulate
for competitive position in the global market, but rather for the protection
69
of local interests.1
This statutory bias is reinforced by the traditionally captive nature of
the domestic listings market. 70 Domestic issuer interests can therefore be
minimized and securities regulators can sometimes overregulate in
furtherance of other statutory interests. Overregulation of domestic issuers
can also result from a regulator paying undue heed to one of its other
domestic interests, such as investors. 7 ' Therefore, domestic issuers have
limited options if they want or need to retain a public listing.'72
Overregulation can therefore subsist for long periods of time in domestic
markets.'73 However, if this overregulation occurs in the global markets, its
consequences are realized more quickly where issuer choice is more
elastic.' 74 Again, though, monopolist regulators may not be responsive to
this early warning sign of overregulation because non-domestic issuers are
not a regulatory focus.
The empire-building nature of regulatory agencies is also relevant.
Organizational theory postulates that regulators tend to favor regulation
168. This would be contrariwise to a regulatory aggrandizement theory under which the
securities regulator should favor a regulatory scheme that attracts the maximum number of
listings. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 9, at 923 ("[R]egulators themselves benefit when many
issuers and investors choose to be governed by their regulations. The regulators benefit from the
increased size and importance of their own agencies."). But regulators, as monopolists, may be
satisfied with the regulatory price captured from their domestic markets.
169. This is part and parcel of their monopoly position which produces an economic incentive
to overregulate. See William J. Carney, Introduction to the 2003 Randolph W. Thrower
Symposium: Business Law: The Impact of Competition on Regulation, 52 EMORY L.J. 1285,
1287 (2003).
170. See supra Part II.B. This is particularly true of the U.S. market where establishing
overseas listings without a domestic listing is quite difficult due to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934's requirement for a U.S. issuer to mandatorily register once it achieves a minimum U.S.
shareholding and asset base. See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
171. A good example of this is seen in the SEC's sometimes single-minded favoritism
towards regulation protective of the average stockholder over other interests. See, e.g., Donald C.
Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process
of Policy Formulation,47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 535 (1990) (discussing the SEC's takeover
regulation as serving the average, retail investor through promulgation of a "primary objective of
egalitarianism").
172. This is because U.S. securities laws currently do not permit a U.S. issuer to delist freely
and maintain a public float. See Rock, supra note 155, at 683 (stating that under current U.S.
securities laws, "for a typical firm to deregister, it must 'go private,' " that is, eliminate its status
as a public company).
173. See Tung, supra note 146, at 562 (arguing that home country regulators "need not offer
their domestic issuers much choice because those issuers typically cannot avoid their home
jurisdictions").
174. See, e.g., Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 9, at 393 ("Regulatory
competition also more quickly corrects for policy mistakes than a single regulator can, because in
a competitive market, there is a built-in self-correcting mechanism ....).
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that expands their jurisdiction and power.'75 In the global market for
listings, empire building can take the form of overregulation and expansive
jurisdictional claims. 7 6 For example, the SEC asserts a broad view of its
global jurisdiction; it has repeatedly exercised its power extraterritorially to
bring non-domestic enforcement action against non-domestic issuers in
tandem with local regulators. 177 Empire building can therefore have a
chilling effect on a jurisdiction's competitiveness in the global listings
market. Non-domestic issuers may fear additional, significant regulatory
oversight by a non-domestic agency with whom they do not have the same
ability to enforce their rights or otherwise influence the regulatory
process. 178 These non-domestic issuers may therefore choose to list in
jurisdictions where regulators take narrower jurisdictional views and thus
choose to rely upon home market regulators to enforce securities
regulation. '79 Empire building may therefore lead regulators to regulate
non-domestic issuers, but it may also produce inefficient results.
There is also the possibility of industry capture and other interestbiased regulation. Public choice theory predicts that a securities regulator
should act to maximize its external welfare by catering to those interest
groups who will benefit it the most. 8 ' These interests are typically
domestic ones: those of domestic investors, issuers, stock markets, and
175. The theory is classically stated in ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967).
The SEC, and any regulatory agency for that matter, is likely to oppose issuer choice since it
would result in diminishment of its power. See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency
Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOzO L.
REV. 909, 916 (1994) ("[Ijnstitutional biases ... provide the best criteria for predicting agency
behavior.").
176. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of
American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 226-27 (1997) (arguing that the
overbroad extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws will disincentivize non-U.S. issuers
from including U.S. investors in their offerings).
177. See Macey, supra note 175, at 948 ("The SEC's major litigation efforts and regulatory
initiatives have been designed to protect the Commission's regulatory turf, rather than to further
important areas of public policy.").
178. See, e.g., Choi & Guzman, supra note 176, at 228-30.
179. This trend is arguably illustrated by the non-U.S. issuer reaction to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the sometimes consequent claim that a listing on a less regulated exchange is the product
of an attempt to avoid application of the Act. See, e.g., Andrew Hill, LSE Shareholders Need
More Cake, Not More Icing, FN. TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 22, 2006, at 22 (describing a U.S.
company's shareholders' decision to list on the AIM rather than on Nasdaq due to differences in
listing standards).
180. Regulators favoring these interests can also become captive by regulating solely to these
needs. In some instances, this capture could theoretically produce regulation attractive to global
issuers. For example, if a regulator becomes captive of issuer or stock market interests who favor
issuer choice, it may then regulate to those interests. Cf Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard,
Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 44-46 (2003) (arguing that "market
forces are unlikely to correct the biases affecting monopolistic regulators" and will thus continue
to act solely for the interests of groups who will benefit it).
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other domestic actors such as investment banks, attorneys, and accountants.
The effect on non-domestic issuers depends upon which interest groups
capture the regulator. So, regulation catering to stock market interests may
lead to beneficial regulation for non-domestic issuers. More often, it
produces regulation catering to domestic actors, reinforcing their
competitive position in the market and producing regulation detrimental to
non-domestic issuers.18'
Regulator interests and actions thus have the theoretical potential for
undue effects on domestic and non-domestic issuers and the jurisdiction's
competitive position in the global listings market.' 82 Because of the nature
of regulators, the consequences for non-domestic issuers may not be of
particular concern for these regulators:
they will instead focus on
regulating towards their statutorily defined domestic interests. Moreover,
empire building and the largely captive domestic listings market may
reinforce regulation that is inefficient for both domestic, as well as non-

domestic, issuers.

83

D. Stock Markets
The world's major stock markets are now largely for-profit
enterprises. 184 The primary sources of their revenue are listing and trading
fees.' 85 Stock markets therefore have a strong interest in obtaining the
highest number of listings and concomitant trading volume and in
advocating for a level of regulation that produces these conditions.'86 This
goal will sometimes be hampered by regulators who set suboptimal
regulation (from a stock market perspective) in order to satisfy their own
interests and the interests of other constituents. 8 7 Unlike issuers, though,
181. This phenomenon could explain, for example, how regulation in the United States,
makes delisting from U.S. markets impractical or even impossible for both U.S. issuers and nonU.S. issuers equally.
182. See generally Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:
Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998) (examining different models and examples
of regulatory theory).
183. The actual historical actions of the SEC as it comports with this theory will be discussed
further infra Part IV.D.
184. See Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
2541, 2560-65 (2006) (looking at the historical trend of non-profit stock exchange
demutualization and asserting that "[o]n balance, the trend is clearly toward demutualization").
185. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 39, at 317.
186. This is a species of the "issuer choice" argument, but from a stock market perspective.
Stock markets have the potential to exert particular influence in the United States since here
securities regulation is a cooperative effort between the SEC and self-regulatory agencies that
historically have been, in part, component subsidiaries of the stock markets. See Fleckner, supra
note 184, at 2572-75 (examining the competitive boundaries of stock market competition and
self-regulation).
187. See supra Part U.C.
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stock markets can more easily migrate across the globe, establishing or
buying stock markets in other jurisdictions. 188 Theoretically, stock markets
should therefore respond to regulatory inefficiency by erecting multiple
markets in separate jurisdictions in order to provide global issuers a menu
of regulatory choice for their listings. This is simple consumer economics:
the stock markets are only providing a product-a listing-and therefore,
in order to maximize profit, will take the necessary steps to ensure that that
product is optimal for their consumers, the issuers.189
The recent wave of consolidation engulfing the exchanges reflects
these forces and interests. Stock markets are combining within regions (for
example, Euronext and OMX). 19 0 They are also consolidating globally: the

NYSE has acquired Euronext, and the Nasdaq has agreed to acquire
OMX.' 9 ' Nasdaq, as of February 10, 2007, had purchased 29.16% of the
LSE and failed in a bid to purchase the remaining outstanding shares. 92
Meanwhile, the Deutsche Bdrse and TSE also have been rumored to be
further participants in this global consolidation with either each other or
other exchanges.' 93 This trend is likely to produce a smaller number of
global stock markets and more regionally based, rather than local, trading
markets.' 94 Importantly, the global and regional reach of these markets
188. Professor Licht terms this "stock exchange mobility," a force spurred by reduced
international regulation. See Amir N. Licht, Stock Exchange Mobility, Unilateral Recognition,
and the Privatizationof Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 583, 584-85 (2001).
189. See, e.g., id. at 616-17 (analogizing the competition for listings to competition in the
consumer retail market),
190. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. In June of 2007, the LSE also made a
takeover bid to acquire the Borsa Italiana. See Alistair McDonald, LSE Snags Borsa Italiana,
Beating Out NYSE Euronext, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2007, at B3. See generally Amir N. Licht,
Stock Market Integration in Europe (Harvard Inst. for Int'l Dev., CAER Discussion Paper No. 15,
1997), availableat http://www.faculty.idc.ac.il/licht/SMIEur.pdf (examining this general trend of
regional integration).
191. Julia Werdigier, Nasdaq Agrees to Buy OMX, Operatorof 7 Stock Exchanges in Europe,
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2007, at C3.
192. See Press Release, NASDAQ, Final Offers Lapsed (Feb. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2007/ne-section07_014.stm.
Nasdaq subsequently
announced that it v.ould sell this stake to facilitate the financing of its bid for OMX. See Julia
Werdigier, Nasdaq, Its Overtures Scorned, Says It Will Sell Its Stake in the London Exchange,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at C3.
193. On January 31, 2007, the TSE and NYSE announced a non-exclusive alliance to work
together on "trading technology, investment products, marketing and regulation." Gaston F.
Ceron, NYSE and Tokyo Tie a Knot, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2007, at C2. Moreover, this
consolidating trend is truly global and is exemplified by the NYSE's recent purchase of a fivepercent stake in India's National Exchange. Aaron Lucchetti & Eric Bellman, NYSE Extends
Reach to India, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2007, at C3. See generally Susan Wolburgh Jenah,
Commentary on a Blueprint for Cross-BorderAccess to U.S. Investors: A New International
Framework, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 69, 70 (2007).
194. See Poser, supra note 57, at 539 (observing that "the stock exchanges of the United
States and Europe seem to be on a course of consolidation, largely driven by the need of the large
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should make them less sensitive to the vagaries of regulation in a particular
jurisdiction. If a market is overregulated, global and regional stock markets
will maintain an equal regulatory footing among domestic competition,
while at the same time having the ability to direct global listings to their
affiliated, less regulated exchanges. For example, the NYSE can now
direct issuers who are dissatisfied with the level of regulation in the United
States to the Euronext, which may have a more attractive regulatory
regime. These issuers would then gain many of the benefits of a NYSE
listing without having to subject themselves to U.S. regulation. The market
for global listings is thus likely to become even more fluid in the future. It
will provide greater flexibility for issuers to cross-list in different markets
and engage in regulatory arbitrage but still permit them to utilize the
technology and expertise of a preferred exchange.' 95
III. THE REGULATION OF THE GLOBAL LISTINGS MARKET
This Part sets forth the current scope of regulation for global
listings. 96 The purpose is to establish further a generalized framework to
analyze, in Part IV, the effects of domestic regulation on a jurisdiction's
competitive status in the global listings market, as well as the extent any
such regulation embodies the interests of the market's primary actors. The
particular focus in this section is upon the U.S. regulation of global listings.
This is because U.S. securities regulation is generally viewed as the
benchmark against which other jurisdictions are measured.'9 7 This Article
is also an attempt to prescribe a future regulatory norm for U.S. regulation
of non-U.S. issuers. Nonetheless, this Part will discuss alternative higher
and lower comparative regulatory schemes in order to set forth the
comparative array of regulation available in the global market for listings.

firms and institutions that control order flow to reduce transaction costs"). See generally Chris
Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Market for Securities Laws (Sept. 14, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1014683 (examining the trend of
acquisition of foreign competitors by U.S. stock exchanges and its consequences for regulatory
competition in the global listings market).
195. The global technology and expertise offered by stock markets is wholly transportable
when it is an electronic trading system. This partially explains the move by the NYSE away from
its open outcry system. Cf. Poser, supra note 57, at 524-27 (examining the competitive
differences between open outcry and electronic trading methods).
196. Again, because the market for domestic listings is unique and different from the global
market, the focus of this Part is upon the regulation of global listings and not domestic ones.
197. See David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to ProfessorMacey, 16 CARDOzO L.

REV. 1765, 1779 (1995) (tracing the role of the SEC in the structure of U.S. securities regulation
and asserting that the "U.S. securities markets are the best securities markets in the world").
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The U.S. Regulatory Model

One of two levels of U.S. regulation applies to global issuers who
raise capital in the United States, depending upon the nature of the issuer's
capital raising and listing status.' 98 The first level is a high one: it covers
issuers who fully list and raise capital publicly in the U.S. market. The
second level is a significantly lower one applicable to issuers who raise
capital privately and do not otherwise list on a U.S. stock market. There is
also a third scheme intertwined with the other two that regulates the ability
of U.S. investors to invest in private offerings. I discuss each of these
below.
1. Public Capital Raising and Listings
The SEC has promulgated a differentiated regulatory model for issuers
listing and publicly raising capital in the U.S. market. A full-fledged
regulatory scheme extends to domestic issuers, while an alternative one is
applicable to non-U.S. issuers, otherwise known as foreign private
issuers.'99 The regime for non-U.S. issuers requires a lower level of
disclosure for raising public capital under the Securities Act than that
required for domestic issuers. It also significantly exempts non-U.S.
issuers from the Exchange Act's reporting requirements.
Non-U.S. issuers are thus relieved from many of the Exchange Act's
strictures otherwise applicable to domestic issuers, including Form 10-Q
quarterly reporting, Section 14A proxy regulation, Section 16 short-swing
reporting requirements and rules, and Regulation FD disclosure.2"° The
SEC has also erected a regime of relaxed and specific form disclosure for
non-U.S. issuers in their remaining Exchange Act reporting. Annual
reports can be filed under Form 20-F as opposed to a Form 10-K, while an
issuer does not need to report material events on Form 8-K but rather must
only report home country filings on Form 6-K. 0 ' In both instances, the
requirements for disclosure are principally those promulgated by the

198. See generally I EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS chs. 2, 6 (7th ed. 2004) (delineating the regulation

applicable to global issuers who raise capital in the U.S. markets).
199. This alternative regulatory system dates to the late 1980s; from that time, the SEC
promulgated a series of tailored rules and exemptions designed to accommodate non-domestic
issuers listing and publicly raising capital in the United States. See Daniel A. Braverman, U.S.
Legal ConsiderationsAffecting Global Offerings of Shares in Foreign Companies, 17 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 30, 31 (1996) (discussing how securities regulations affect offerings outside the
United States).
200. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (2007) (exemption from Sections 14(a), 14(b), 14(c), 14(f)
and 16 of the Exchange Act); § 240.13a- 13 (exemption from Form I0-Q quarterly reporting
requirements); Id. §§ 243.100-. 103 (exemption from Regulation FD).
201. See Forms, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.220f, 249.306 (2007).
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International Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"). They
are relaxed from the domestic standards that comport with the general
needs of non-domestic issuers and permit a measure of parity with
disclosure required in a non-U.S. issuer's home country. 0 2 In particular,
the audited financial statements that must be included in a non-U.S. issuer's
annual report on Form 20-F can be reconciled with the U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles ("U.S. GAAP"), while mandated disclosure
therein concerning executive compensation and other items is held to a
lower standard. 2 3 Finally, with regard to public capital raising, the SEC
has adopted specific forms under the Securities Act for non-U.S. issuers.2°
These forms set lower standards of disclosure, similar to Exchange Act
requirements, including the ability for non-U.S. issuers to include financial
rather than prepared in
statements that are U.S. 2GAAP-reconciled
5
1
GAAP.
U.S.
with
accordance
This issued regulation makes no distinction among non-U.S. issuers
with respect to the level of home country regulation imposed. In fact, the
SEC has never even considered, proposed, or adopted regulation which
would adjust the level of regulation applicable to a non-U.S. issuer
depending upon the nature of its home country regulation. The regime for
non-U.S. issuers simply applies universally. Thus, issuers listed on the
LSE, organized in and regulated by the United Kingdom and therefore
subject to significant home country regulation, are treated identically as
issuers who have their primary listing in the United States but who are
otherwise organized under the laws of the Philippines and are subject to

202. See International Disclosure Standards, Securities Act Release No. 7745, [1999 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (Sept. 28, 1999); Integrated Disclosure System for Foreign
Private Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6360, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,054, at 84,648 (Nov. 20, 1981); see also I GREENE ET AL., supra note 198, § 3.03.
203. Moreover, the SEC has adopted a view of materiality under Rule 10b-5 and other
securities antifraud provisions to account for the differing disclosure environment of nondomestic issuers. See, e.g., Cross-Border Tender and Exchange Offers, Business Combinations
and Rights Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 42,054 [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 86,214, at 82,540 (Oct. 22, 1999) (stating that the application of the U.S.
securities laws' antifraud provisions "may be different in the context of foreign disclosure
requirements and practices"). On November 15, 2007, the SEC also voted to permit the use of
International Financial Reporting Standards ("IFRS") without U.S. GAAP reconciliation by
foreign private issuers in their SEC filings. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC
Takes Action To Improve Consistency of Disclosure to U.S. Investors in Foreign Companies
(Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-235.htm.
204. These are Forms F-I, F-3, and F-4. 17 C.F.R. § 239.31 (2007); § 239.33; § 239.34.
205. The SEC also promulgated safe-harbor exemptions from Exchange Act and Securities
Act requirements for non-domestic takeover activity. See generally Brett Carron & Steven M.
Davidoff, Getting U.S. Security Holders to the Party: The SEC's Cross-Border Release Five
Years On, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 455 (2005) (describing the exemptions available to foreign
private issuers in cross-border takeovers).
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significantly less home country regulation and oversight. °6 On its face,
this failure to differentiate is not sensible. Some non-domestic issuers may
therefore be overregulated, subject to overlapping and redundant regulation
under SEC and home country rules, while others, likely from developing
countries, may actually be underregulated.
Moreover, the relaxed regulatory scheme described above received a
significant shock with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act cut a wide swath: the law made no attempt to
distinguish between domestic and non-domestic issuers in the scope or
application of its regulation. 2 7 Thus, the increased level of regulation
imposed on non-U.S. issuers by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been
qualitatively significant. It is also regulation that makes no attempt to take
into account the special needs of non-domestic issuers. For example, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirement that each U.S.-listed issuer have an audit
committee comprised of independent directors is not consistent with the
German statutory mandate that employee representatives constitute half of
any such committee.2 °8 The SEC has been able to smooth out some of
these implementation problems through subsequent rulemaking.2 ° Yet,
even if the SEC wanted to, without congressional action, it can do nothing
about the applicability of Sarbanes-Oxley's core regulation, such as the

206. Here, I am thinking of British Petroleum p.l.c., a publicly traded company listed on the
LSE with a cross-listing on the NYSE, and Psi Technology Holdings, Inc., a company organized
under the laws of the Philippines listed solely on the Nasdaq. BP p.l.c., Form 20-F (Mar. 6,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/313807/000115697307000346/
b848881-20f.htm; PSi Technologies Holdings, Inc., Form 20-F (July 16, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1 106714/000119312507155740/d2Of.htm.
207. See Kenji Taneda, Sarbanes-Oxley, Foreign Issuers and United States Securities
Regulation, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 715, 716-17.
208. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3)(B) (2004) (section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley) (prohibiting
affiliation or compensation of members of the audit committee). See generally Anupama J.
Naidu, Was Its Bite Worse Than Its Bark? The Costs Sarbanes-Oxley Imposes on German Issuers
May Translate into Costs to the United States, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 271, 272 (2004)
(discussing the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on German issuers). When enacted, the audit committee
requirement was also in tension with the rules of other countries on the selection and
independence of auditors. See Taneda, supra note 207, at 739 (noting the conflict between the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the laws of many European countries since "it is common in Europe for
outside auditors to be appointed directly by the shareholders, not by a special committee of
independent directors").
209. See, e.g., Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-8220, [2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 86,902 (Apr. 9, 2003)
(adopting certain exemptions and clarifying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's independent audit
committee requirements for foreign private issuers).
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much-maligned requirement that all domestic and non-U.S. issuers certify
their disclosure controls and procedures. 1 °
2. Private Capital Raising
The U.S. regulatory scheme applicable to those who raise capital
privately is entirely different than the one applicable to public capital
raising. A private capital raising can be defined under U.S. securities law
as an offering that is made solely to sophisticated investors as established
through a net worth requirement and not through the public market. 2 1 The
regulatory regime applicable to such a capital raising is limited. Generally,
so long as an issuer raises capital privately from investors with aggregate
minimum worth, the offering does not need to be registered, and generally
only the antifraud provisions of the securities laws apply.212 Moreover, the
offering can be underwritten if it is confined to qualified institutional
buyers; these are generally investors who hold more than $100 million
worth of securities. 2 3 This offering exemption, known as a Rule 144A
offering, is the preferred method of non-domestic issuers to offer securities
in the United States, and it is the primary regulatory vehicle that nondomestic issuers now employ to raise U.S. capital. 214 In 2005, non-U.S.
issuers raised $53.2 billion in the private markets through Rule 144A
offerings, compared to $4.7 billion in the public markets.2 5
210. Non-U.S. issuer protest has been particularly vigorous at Sarbanes-Oxley's Section 404
requirement as to certification of disclosure controls and procedures. See INTERIM CAPITAL
MARKETS REPORT, supra note 1, at 115-16.
211. There are also exemptions available for capital raisings extended to a limited number of
unaccredited investors. See C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1120-26 (discussing the structure of securities registration
exemptions for sophisticated and unsophisticated investors).
212. These exemptions are embodied under the judicial gloss placed on Section 4(2) of the
Securities Act and Rule 506 of Regulation D. Id. at 1120-24. A Rule 144A offering by a nonU.S. issuer is often combined with a Regulation S offering to shareholders outside the United
States. See Trig R. Smith, Note, The S.E.C. and Regulation of ForeignPrivate Issuers: Another
Missed Opportunity at Meaningful Regulatory Change, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 765, 771-73
(2000) (describing the use of Regulation S and Rule 144A by foreign private issuers). For a
description of the parameters of Regulation S, the governing rules for securities offerings made
outside the United States, see Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, [198990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [ 84,524 (Apr. 24, 1990).
213. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1991); see also Resale of Restricted Securities, Changes to
Method of Determining Holding Period of Restricted Securities under Rules 144 and 145,
Securities Act Release No. 33-6862 [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,523, at 80, 641-42 (Apr. 23, 1990).
214. See Luis F. Moreno Trevino, Access to U.S. CapitalMarkets for Foreign Issuers: Rule
144A Private Placements, 16 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 159, 195 (1993).
215. INTERIM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at x; see also Zingales, supra note 48, at 7
(finding that "94% (by value) of the global IPOs that do not list in the United States (57% by
number) still choose to market their issues" to institutional investors through a Rule 144A
offering).
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The U.S. reporting regime under the Exchange Act is automatically
triggered for a domestic issuer once it exceeds more than 500 shareholders
of record and has more than $10 million in assets. 1 6 It is triggered for a
non-U.S. issuer once it exceeds 300 shareholders residing in the United
States. 217 For domestic issuers, this rule applies no matter the method of
capital raised, whether public or private. 218 It is different for non-U.S.
issuers. Here, Rule 12g3-2b of the Exchange Act provides an exemption to
the Exchange Act reporting requirements. 2 9 A non-U.S. issuer who elects
to furnish certain information to the SEC that they are otherwise required to
file with their home regulator and whose securities are not listed or quoted
on a U.S. market is exempt from the reporting requirements of the
Exchange Act, even if they have more than 300 shareholders residing in the
United States. 220 Thus, unlike domestic issuers, non-U.S. issuers can
widely offer securities privately by availing themselves of the Rule 12g32b exemption and effectively avoid triggering the Exchange Act's reporting
requirements. The Rule 12g3-2b exemption is a powerful exemption that
permits non-U.S. issuers to raise capital privately in the United States
through a Rule 144A offering subject to only minimal regulation.221
Many non-U.S. issuers also pair their private equity capital raising
with a level-one American Depositary Receipt program.222 This is a trading
program established using the Rule 12g3-2b exemption by a depositary
bank for non-U.S. issuers who have not previously raised equity capital
through a U.S. registered offering.223 Shares are deposited in the program,
and the depositary bank then issues depositary receipts representing these
shares. The depositary receipts are then tradable on the over-the-counter

216. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2002) (500 shareholder requirement); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2007)
($10 million in assets requirement).
217. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(1) (2007).
218. See Louis LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 1762 (4th ed. 2001 &
Supp. 2003). In addition, the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act are triggered if the
issuer has any securities listed for trading on any national securities exchange or otherwise makes
a registered offering of securities under the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(a), 78o(d)
(2000).
219. § 240.12g3-2(b)(l).
220. Id.
221. See generally Susan Chaplinsky & Latha Ramchand, The Impact of SEC Rule 144A on
Corporate Debt Issuance by International Firms, 77 J. BUS. 1073 (2004) (describing the
preference of non-U.S. issuers to structure their U.S. offerings as non-public ones under Rule
144A in order to sidestep U.S. regulation).
222. See generally Mark A. Saunders, American Depositary Receipts: An Introduction to
U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign Companies, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 48 (1993) (providing a
comprehensive overview of ADR programs).
223. Id. at 54-57.
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market with the prices displayed in the Pink Sheets.2 2 4 The majority of
non-U.S. issuers with securities traded in the United States elect to have
their securities traded in this manner, including such well-known
companies as Nestle and Nintendo.2 2 5 These facilities are not optimal from
either an investor or non-U.S. issuer perspective. For investors, trading in
these securities is not on a primary market and therefore is often illiquid,
with low volume and high bid-ask spreads. 26
Pricing is also not
transparent and analyst coverage typically nonexistent.227 Moreover, while
issuers are exempt from Exchange Act reporting requirements with a Level
I program, they cannot access the public capital markets nor generally use
their securities as an acquisition currency in the U.S. market without
becoming subject to such requirements. 28 Thus, the benefits that non-U.S.
issuers expect from a cross-listing do not exist with a quotation on the Pink
Sheets.
3. U.S. Investors
There is a separate regulatory scheme that determines which U.S.
investors can invest in private offerings in the United States. I have already
noted, in Part III.A.2, that private offerings are limited to U.S. investors
who meet minimum aggregate wealth thresholds.
Practically, in
widespread offerings outside of the venture capital community, issuers
limit their sales even more narrowly to qualified institutional investors,
such as mutual or hedge funds with more than $100 million in liquid
assets.2 2 9 These investors can therefore freely invest, without regulatory
limitation, in both private and public offerings in the United States. There
is also no regulatory barrier to sophisticated investors, i.e., qualified
institutional investors, investing in non-domestic issuers who choose not to

224. Id. at 57. To conduct a Rule 144A offering, a non-U.S. issuer must not offer securities
of the same class as securities listed on a U.S. national securities exchange registered under
Section 6 of the Exchange Act (e.g., the NYSE) or quoted on a U.S. automated inter-dealer
quotation system (e.g., the Nasdaq). 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(3) (2007). The Pink Sheets is a
pricing and financial information service for securities quoted on the over-the-counter markets.
See Pink Sheets-Electronic Quotation and Trading System for OTC Securities,
http://www.pinksheets.compink/about/index.jsp (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
225. There are currently over 1,200 non-U.S. issuers with this type of ADR program. See
Bank of New York Depositary Receipt Database, http://www.adrbny.comdr-directory.jsp (last
visited Feb. 17, 2007).
226. See Andrew G. Karoyli, The Role of American Depositary Receipts in the Development
of Emerging Equity Markets, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 670, 687 (2004).
227. Id.
228. See American Depositary Receipts, Exchange Act Release No. 34-29226, [1990-1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,740, at 81,594 (May 30, 1991).
229. This is largely because these offerings are most frequently accomplished under the
auspices of Rule 144A. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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even access the U.S. capital markets.23 These are the majority of non-U.S.
issuers: the approximately 33,000 non-U.S. issuers who maintain a listing
abroad and never raise capital in the United States. 3' The only barrier to
sophisticated U.S. investors investing in these issuers is a practical one;
namely, a relationship is needed with a broker who can execute these
trades. However, these large investors generally do have the sophistication
and wherewithal to establish the international brokerage network
connections necessary to invest freely outside the United States.232
Non-sophisticated, or retail, U.S. investors do not have similar
freedom. First, they are effectively restricted by SEC regulation from
investing in significant private offerings; they can generally access only
public offerings.2 33 This restriction effectively bars retail investors from the
bulk of the U.S. market for non-domestic offerings that are confined to
sophisticated investors. Moreover, U.S. retail investors cannot invest
outside the United States with the ease of sophisticated investors. 234 Many
brokers will not execute trades for retail investors on non-U.S.
exchanges. 35 If an investor can find a willing broker, the execution costs
for any trade are quite high, transparency and pricing are less than optimal,
and execution is delayed. 236 Retail investors are also often restricted by
230. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
231. As of December 31, 2005, it is estimated that there were over 33,000 publicly listed nonU.S. issuers who did not maintain a U.S. listing. This estimate is based on an analysis by the
author of data made publicly available by the World Federation of Exchanges, and the number is
higher than this as this database does not include all international stock markets. See World
Fed'n of Exchs., Number of Listed Companies 2005, http://www.world-exchanges.org/
publications/EQUITY305.XLS (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
232. They accomplish this by executing their trades through affiliates that are outside the
United States, thereby sidestepping the SEC's broker-dealer restrictions and Regulation S
requirements. See I GREENE ET AL., supra note 198, § 9.03[3].
233. The SEC has promulgated in Rule 506 of Regulation D a de minimis safe harbor for
retail investors to participate in direct private offerings by issuers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007).
However, most non-U.S. issuers choose to issue securities under Rule 144A, which does not
contain such an exception and, even if they do issue directly, choose to limit their offering to
qualified institutional investors for liability and practical reasons. See § 230.144.
234. The trend, though, is for more brokers to offer this service to retail investors in response
to heightened retail investor demand for trading access to non-U.S. issuers. See, e.g., Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc., Global Investing Services, http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/
investment-products/stocks/global-investing?cmsid=P-981910&lvl I=investment-products&
lvl2=stocks (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) (offering investment assistance to retail investors with
respect to foreign non-U.S. listed stocks).
235. Foreign brokers in particular are leery of executing such trades because they may, by
virtue of such action, subject themselves to U.S. broker-dealer regulation. See I GREENE ET AL.,
supra note 198, § 9.02 (noting the SEC position that "using the U.S. mails, wires, or telephone
lines to trade securities with U.S. persons located in this country" could require a foreign brokerdealer to register in the United States).
236. See Aaron Lucchetti, How to Buy Foreign Shares, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12-13, 2006, at
BI.
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issuers from investing in their offerings as a consequence of the structure of
the U.S. securities laws.237 Consequently, retail investors who, at this time,
want to invest abroad can practically and efficiently invest only in issuers
who fully list on the U.S. market.
B.

Alternative Regulatory Models

The U.S. securities regulatory scheme is arguably the benchmark
against which the world's other securities regimes are measured. This does
not mean that these other regulatory systems aspire to mimic the U.S.
regime; rather, they look to the United States to measure the
appropriateness of their regulation, borrowing from the United States as
they deem appropriate and differentiating themselves where economic or
other interests militate. In the global market for listings, this has led to
three generalized competing schemes that can be grouped into low,
medium, and high regulatory models.
1. The Low Regulation Model
The low regulation model is one that is now best embodied in the
AIM. The AIM initially began as a small-cap market for companies with a
need to raise public capital.238 It is still largely a small capitalized market
but, as of October 31, 2006, it had 1,307 listed issuers, 395 of which were
issuers with a market capitalization greater than $100 million and forty-six
of which were issuers with a market capitalization greater than $500
million.239 Moreover, the AIM is increasingly viewed as an attractive
listing environment for issuers due to its relaxed listing requirements. The
AIM currently has no substantive listing rules other than a requirement to
237. There are many ways the requirements of the U.S. securities laws foster exclusion of
U.S. persons. First, if the non-U.S. issuer's securities are held of record by more than 300
persons, it triggers the reporting requirements under the Exchange Act. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g3-2(a) (2007). An issuer therefore may choose to exclude investors located in the
United States in order to stay below this 300-person threshold. Second, the Regulation S "safe
harbor" from registration is unavailable if U.S. residents purchase the distributed securities within
any restricted period. See id. § 230.900. And under Rule 903(a), the offer must be an "offshore
transaction," which Rule 902(i) defines as one that does not include purchases by a U.S. resident.
§§ 230.902-03. Resales by a non-U.S. resident who made a proper purchase under Rule 904 to a
U.S. resident also violate the "safe harbor" if the sale occurs within the restricted period. See
§ 230.904. Therefore, a non-U.S. issuer has incentives to exclude U.S. persons in order to
maintain a "good" offering under Regulation S.
238. For a comprehensive description and history of the regulatory scheme governing the
AIM, see Jose Miguel Mendoza, Securities Regulation in Low-Tier Listing Venues: The Rise of
the Alternative Investment Market (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1004548.
239. London Stock Exch., AIM Market Statistics, Oct. 31, 2006, http://www.london
stockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/98BE8920-8CFB-483F-8D37-4F006B 12C663/0/LISTDATE
AIMCOS.XLS (converted from U.K. pounds to U.S. dollars at $1 = £ 0.5128).
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be represented by a nominated advisor and file an admissions document.24 °
Even these bare requirements for an admissions document can be waived if
the issuer has been previously listed for eighteen months on another
"'
designated market.24
The key to AIM regulation is the nominated advisor. These are vetted
brokers who guide the issuer through the listing process and any ongoing
requirements of the AIM.242 The AIM is thus a "reputational" market.
Investors rely upon the prior reputation of the nominated advisors as a
proxy for the quality of issuers listed rather than on the regulation itself.
The AIM, discussed in Part I.B, has experienced explosive growth.
Yet, it is not without its problems. First, AIM-listed companies have
delivered a meager cumulative gain of just one percent, for a compound
annual return of 0.1% over a nine-year period ending in 2005.243 Second,
in recent years a number of registered nominated advisors, responsible for
ensuring an AIM-listed company's good behavior, were themselves
privately censored. 2" Third, the AIM has had some high-profile failures,
such as the near implosion of Regal Petroleum. 24 5 Finally, the AIM has
been criticized for high volatility, illiquidity, and large spreads in trading.246
The average daily traded volume on the AIM for each issuer in 2006 was
only two percent of issuers on the Nasdaq. 247 These problems are all
240. LONDON STOCK ExCH., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES, Rules I & 3, at 4 (2007),
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/9lB 19E7D-550C-440A-BCCA-52A32FI9
13DB/0/AIMRULESFORCOMPANIES_2007.pdf.
241. Id., Rule 3, at4.
242. See, e.g., id. at Introduction ("Where an AIM company has concerns about the
interpretation of these rules, it should consult its nominated adviser."). Notably, the AIM does
impose a modicum of on-going reporting obligations on listed issuers, including half-yearly
reporting and disclosure requirements. Id., Rules 17 & 18, at 36-37 (notification of material
information and requirement for half-yearly reports).
243. Philip Coggan, Ready, Aim, Fire! But Investors Can Miss the Target, FIN. TIMES
(London), Feb. 25, 2006, at 14. In contrast, the United States' Russell 2000, a similarly
composed small capitalization index of U.S. issuers, returned an annual rate of 8.57% during this
time period. Bloomberg Terminal Database (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
244. lain Dey, You Have To Go into AIM with Your Eyes Open, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
(London), June 18, 2006, at 6.
245. Peter Garnham & Philip Stafford, Small-Caps: Regal Petroleum's Share Price Suffers
Steep Slide, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 1, 2006, at 46 (reporting a 69% slide in Regal Petroleum
shares in one trading day). There are a number of other examples. For example, Chariot, an
alternative lottery company, crashed within four weeks of its initial public offering. See Matthew
Garrahan, Monday Blues Leave ChariotShaky, FIN. TIMES (London), June 6, 2006, at 21.
246. Forty percent of listed issuers on the AIM regularly do not have their shares traded in
any given trading day. Coggan, supra note 243; see also Harvey Jones, AIMing for Recovery,
WHAT INVESTMENT (London), Dec. I, 2006, at 12, available at http://www.whatinvestment.
co.uk/shares/in-depth/253766/aiming-for-recovery.thtml (noting that "small, high-risk companies
typically trade on wider spreads [on the AIM] than companies on the main market, and liquidity
can often be a problem").
247. See McKINSEY REPORT, supra note 42, at 52.
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consequences that financial theorists predict should exist on any lightly
regulated, small capitalization market. 48
The AIM, despite these issues, appears to be competing with the U.S.
regulatory model on the lower end of the capitalization scale as it is gaining
market share in the global listings market for these issuers.249 The AIM
also appears to be expanding its market, gaining traction in the competition
for global listings among larger capitalized issuers.25 ° The continuance of
this trend is uncertain: further implosions, continued low returns, or other
difficulties associated with the AIM's low regulation mantra may all work
to bring the AIM's rise to a halt. Yet, the continued listings trend remains
upward and the economic by-product effects of larger mass, such as thicker
markets, are likely to mitigate some of the AIM's problems. In the short
term, the AIM is likely to be a more severe competitor to the U.S. model on
the lower end of the range where higher regulation costs are more
significant to issuers; rent seeking is more prevalent; and the desire for a
higher equity rating, lower cost of capital, and other benefits of a high
regulation model is often outweighed by more immediate cash flow
desires.25 1 Moreover, with the AIM's success have come imitators: the
Growth Enterprise Market of the HKSE and the Entry Level listings
standards of the Deutsche Borse are the two most significant.252 In the
future, it is likely that there will be a competitive trend towards additional
lower regulation markets, and a further siphoning off of low market
capitalization issuers from more highly regulated markets into low
regulation models.

248. See generally Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities
Regulation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 333 (2006) (examining the positive effects of strong regulation
on stock market markets).
249. In light of its public problems, the LSE has announced a review of the AIM's regulations
intended to regulate the market more fully. David Blackwell, LSE to Review Aim Regulations,
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 2, 2006, at 21.
250. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
251. Because of these issues, the likelihood that the AIM, or any other low regulation
exchange, will expand deeply into the larger capitalized global listings market is unlikely. I
discuss this further infra Part IV.A.
252. Other exchanges observing the success of the AIM have also expressed interest in the
lower end of the market. See, e.g., Joe Bolger, Threat to AIM as Singapore Looks at Own Junior
Market, TIMES (London), May 17, 2006, at 53 (reporting that the Singapore Exchange is studying
a junior market modeled on the AIM). Euronext also has its own such market, Alternext, which
as of October 17, 2006, had only attracted sixty-one listings. Alternext Highlights,
(last visited Feb.
http://www.euronext.com/altemext/landing/0,4486,1732_203915424,00.html
17, 2007).
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2. The Middle Regulation Model
The middle regulation model is a shorthand, catch-all phrase
describing the regulatory regimes existent in the primary developed
European and Asian markets. These regimes can be classified into two
distinct archetypes: a dispersed ownership model and a concentrated
ownership one. 253 The concentrated ownership regulatory scheme is one
present in jurisdictions where a substantial majority of issuers have a
significant shareholder. The regulation in these regimes is designed to
accommodate, or is the economic cause of, such concentration. 4
Conversely, the dispersed ownership regulatory model is characterized by
widespread ownership of shares. It too is built to accommodate, or is the
cause of, such ownership dispersion. 5
The dispersed ownership model exists in its most prominent form in
the United States and the United Kingdom.25 6 The LSE is therefore the
U.S. market's primary global competitor in this regulatory subcategory." 7
As expected from economically similar ownership models, the regulatory
scheme of the LSE is broadly analogous to the U.S. market, and in some
cases is more strict than the U.S. one.25 8 For example, issuers listed on the
LSE have historically been required to make real-time disclosure, as
opposed to the periodic disclosure regime in the United States.259 Issuers

253. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 27, at 218.
254. See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World (Harvard Inst. of
Econ. Research, Paper No. 1840, 1998), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 103130 (surveying
the ownership structure of large corporations in twenty-seven wealthy economies and finding
that, except in economies with high shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are
widely held).
255. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 59-64 (2001) (discussing
theories explaining the origins of dispersed ownership markets).
256. But see Clifford G. Holderness, Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, REV.
FIN. STUDIES (forthcoming), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=991363 (finding evidence of
ownership concentration in a representative sample of U.S. public firms with ninety-six percent
having blockholders who own an average of thirty-nine percent of common stock).
257. See Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in
the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 465 (2001) ("The United States has a companion,
however, in the dispersed ownership category, this being the United Kingdom.").
258. See generally Simon Gleeson & Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Public Offer of Securities
in the United Kingdom, 27 DENV. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 359 (1999) (detailing regulations adopted
by the E.U. and the United Kingdom's resulting regulatory scheme).
AND
DISCLOSURE RULES
SERVICES AUTHORITY HANDBOOK,
259. FINANCIAL
RULES,
DTR 2.2.9 (2007), available at http://fsahandbook.infol
TRANSPARENCY
These rules implemented Article 6 of the E.U. Market Abuse
FSA/html/handbook/DTR.
Directive (Directive 2003/6/EC) which mandated the adoption of a continuous disclosure regime.
See FIN. SERV. AUTH., UK IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU MARKET ABUSE DIRECTIVE
(2003/6/EC), Parts I and 2 (2004), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
media/I/B/marketabuse-parts I and2_ 180604.pdf.
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listed on the LSE are also subject to similar reporting requirements and
corporate governance standards as issuers on the U.S. market, albeit
without the SEC's stricter disclosure obligations.21 The most significant
difference between the two is in enforcement. The U.K. regulator, the
Financial Services Authority, is not as active in oversight supervision and
enforcement as the SEC. Further, the U.K. securities market is a
significantly less litigious one than the U.S.'s, and securities class actions
26
are not commonly utilized as an enforcement mechanism. '
Concentrated ownership models predominate in Continental Europe
and in the Asian markets, and they are the more prevalent of the two
types. 62 The most important of these markets are the Deutsche Borse and
Euronext in Europe and the TSE in Asia.263 Market regulation of these
regimes is generally set at a lower level than that in dispersed ownership
regimes.2'
Regulation instead comes through significant or majority
stockholders whose interests largely align with minority holders. 26 Still,
the regulatory requirements of these regimes in Europe include similar
attributes as the dispersed ownership one, including continuous disclosure
requirements, International Accounting Standards ("[AS") or U.S. GAAP

260. Issuers listed on the LSE are subject to annual and half-yearly reporting requirements,
international accounting standard requirements for European companies, and other significant
regulations. See UKLA Listing Rules 4 (listing particulars requirement), 9.8 (annual report and
IAS requirements), and 9.9 (half-yearly report), http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/LR
(last visited Feb. 17, 2007). In addition, similar to Sarbanes-Oxley, the U.K. Financial Services
Authority has adopted a Combined Corporate Code; issuers on the LSE are expected to comply
with the code and disclose the extent of such compliance. FIN. SERV. AUTH., THE COMBINED
CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
ukla/lr.comcode2003.pdf.
261. See Coffee, Impact of Enforcement, supra note 16, at 31-39. See generally Howell E.
Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of FinancialRegulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential
Implications (Harvard Law and Econ., Discussion Paper No. 521, 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=839250 (analyzing data regarding financial regulation in different
countries and concluding that intensity of securities enforcement actions is much higher in the
United States than in Germany and the United Kingdom).
262. See Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, Introduction to THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE
EUROPE, at 19 (Fabrizio Barca & Mario Becht eds., Oxford University Press 2001) (finding that
64.2% of German listed companies, 56.1% of Italian listed companies, and 26.3% of Swedish
listed companies have a controlling majority of shareholders); Stijn Claessens et al., The
Separationof Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations,58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 82 (2000)
(finding that in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Taiwan, and Thailand, over two-thirds of companies are majority controlled).
263. Here, the HKSE is a hybrid-a concentrated ownership model with a regulatory
apparatus based upon the U.K. model. See generally CHINA SECURITIES HANDBOOK 1995-96
(1995).
264. See Coffee, supra note 255, at 3.
265. As Professors Bratton and McCahery point out, this oversight is not always optimal and
can be adversely affected by internal agency costs as well as loss of management objectivity. See
Bratton & McCahery, supra note 27, at 225-27.
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financial statement requirements, prohibitions on insider trading, and
oversight by market regulators.266
In the global listings market at the middle regulatory level, the
primary competitors of the U.S. market are currently the LSE and the
Deutsche Bdrse.2 6' The HKSE, which is a hybrid of the concentrated and
dispersed ownership model, should also be added to this list, but not for its
current status. It has historically failed to attract global listings. Rather,
the HKSE is placed on this list for its competitive potential due to the
increasing strength and thickness of its market and its natural tendency to
be the epicenter of the rapidly growing Chinese listings market.2 68 The
other regulatory markets have not achieved competitive footing; they
largely focus on domestic listings, do not compete in the global listings
market, and lack the characteristics necessary to transform them into a
competitive force.2 69 This is to be expected. In the global marketplace the
markets located in the financial centers of the globe-Frankfurt, Hong
Kong, London, and New York-are most likely to be the leaders; they
offer the concentrated resources of the world's financial centers and the
most active trading markets. Each of these four markets is fundamentally
different in scope and character and keyed to the ownership model of its
domestic companies, but the base-level regulation is broadly the same:
each has its own disclosure requirements and ongoing regulatory
supervision as well as requirements for IAS or U.S. GAAP financial
statements.27 ° Moreover, they all have more commonalities with the U.S.
securities regulation scheme than divergences, and there is an accelerating
global movement towards harmonization of these securities markets.27 '
Additionally, until the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the U.S. market was generally
considered to be the more highly regulated one, but not significantly more
so than the regulatory schemes of the Deutsche Borse, the HKSE, and the

266. This is largely a result of the numerous harmonizing E.U. directives issued over the past
few years. See Roberta S. Karmel, Reform of Public Company Disclosure in Europe, 26 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 379, 380 (2005) (reviewing recent E.U. public market reforms and requirements
and asserting that "[d]isclosure reform in Europe has been patterned to a significant extent on the
legislative framework of U.S. securities laws").
267. See supra Part1.
268. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 62-64, 84 and accompanying text.
270. The non-U.S. regimes often model themselves on IOSCO standards, allowing them to
distinguish themselves from U.S. standards; yet, these standards are increasingly convergent with
U.S. ones. See generally Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 153, at 261-65.
271. Prentice, supra note 126, at 835 (discussing increasing commonality of securities market
regulation). See also Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Creditor Protection,in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW 71, 82 (2004) (observing that "it seems that the capital markets and regulation
are inexorably pressing European and Japanese companies toward the U.S/U.K. model of
financial reporting").
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LSE. 72 All were seen as competitive oandidates in the global listings
market for middle regulation. In light of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, though, the U.S. market is often viewed by many as a significantly
more regulated jurisdiction where the regulation imposed is considered
overly burdensome.27 3

3. The High Regulation Model
The U.S. model is viewed globally as a relatively high regulation
market for listings generally and non-domestic listings particularly, but
there have been sporadic attempts to create a regulatory scheme that is set
at a higher level than the U.S. regulatory scheme. The two most recent
attempts have been the Neuer Markt, a now defunct affiliated market of the
Deutsche Bbirse, and the Novo Mercado, an affiliated market of the Sdo
Paulo stock exchange, the Bovespa 74 Both exchanges promulgated high
listings standards in an attempt to lure both domestic and non-domestic
listings, and which have in some respects exceeded the SEC's own
threshold level of regulation for listings. 275 The Neuer Markt spectacularly
failed while the Novo Mercado has yet to have any material impact on the
global listings market.
The Neuer Markt was launched in 1997 and rapidly gained traction:
as of November 27, 2000 it had listed 318 issuers with an aggregate market
capitalization of $160 billion.2 76 This vigorous start was also reflected in
the Neuer Markt's ability to attract non-domestic issuers due to its
marketing as an alternative choice to Nasdaq for high technology

272. The U.S. market, though, has historically been seen as a significantly more litigious
jurisdiction. See Coffee, Impact of Enforcement, supra note 16, at 31-39.
273. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. See generally Olufunmilayo B. Arewa,
Securities Regulation and Corporate Governance: Small Business, Sarbanes-Oxley and Global
Capital Markets 3 (July 18, 2001) (unpublished draft, on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (discussing the "the implications of SOX for the competitiveness of U.S. capital
markets, particularly with respect to the capital needs of small issuers").
274. These are the two examples which Professor Coffee highlights to support his crossbonding thesis. He concludes that "the relative success of the Neuer Markt and the relative
failure (at least to date) of the Novo Mercado may show that there is a market for 'high
disclosure,' but that emerging market firms are less willing to opt into substantive governance
reform." Coffee, supra note 15, at 1803.
275. See id. at 1804-08.
276. John H. Christy, Queen of Small Caps, FORBES, Nov. 27, 2000, at 312. The Neuer
Markt would peak at 345 issuers. Andrew Cave, Frankfurt to Close Ailing Neuer Markt, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 27, 2002, at 33, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/
main.jhtml;jsessionid=DH5 IIORXAX4E3QFIQMFSFFWAVCBQOIVO?xml=/money/2002/09/2
7/cnneu27.xml.
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companies.27 7 With this success lay the seeds of the Neuer Markt's
collapse: the popping of the technology bubble resulted in a ninety percent
decline in aggregate market capitalization on the Neuer Markt in just one
year, from 2001 to 2002.278 There were also several high-profile issuer
implosions and other scandals left in the wake of this precipitous decline.279
By 2003, the Neuer Markt's reputation was in tatters. With listings and
volume in severe decline, the Deutsche B6rse closed the market and folded
the remaining listings back into its primary market, with two-thirds electing
to be governed by the high regulation scheme of the Deutsche Borse
regulatory system, the prime listings standard.2 80
The Bovespa, the Sdo Paulo stock exchange, launched the Novo
Mercado in 2001.21 The market was established to compete for listings by
small and medium capitalized companies, both domestically and in the
global listings market in Latin America.1 2 Similar to the Neuer Markt, the
competitive strategy of the Novo Mercado has been to establish high
regulatory standards in order to attract listings.283 Issuers who list on the
Novo Mercado must provide minority protections, including full tag-along
rights, must prepare financial statements to U.S. GAAP or IAS, and must
comply with a number of other significant regulatory obligations. 2' The
Novo Mercado has generated substantial publicity for its listing standards,
both generally and within the academic community that follows such
things, but as of December 31, 2006, it had only forty-four listings. 285 Its

growth, until recently, has been slow and, although it has been cited as
spurring innovation in Brazilian regulation and is increasingly attracting
277. See Naidu, supra note 208, at 307 ("The Neuer Markt's model, based on Nasdaq, was
geared toward 'young firms in growing industries,' as opposed to more established blue-chip
companies.").
278. Justin Schack, After the Fall, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 2002, at 33, 40.
279. See Neal E. Boudette, Neuer Markt's Battered Image May Be Poisedfor a Recovery,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2002, atC 11.
280. The remaining one-third elected to be governed by the General Standard segment. Press
Release, Deutsche B6rse (June 3, 2003), available at http://deutsche-boerse.coml
dbag/dispatch/enllistcontent/gdb-navigationhome/Content-Files/10-homepagelNews/t3-press/p
mpr_03-06-03_neusegmentierung.htm.
281. See generally Jonathan Wheatley, Big Year in Brazil, Thanks to Bovespa and Novo
Mercado, FIN. TIMES (U.S.), Dec. 6, 2004, at 26 (discussing the establishment of the Novo
Mercado).
282. See Craig Karmin, Brazil PreparesLaunch of Market to EncourageForeign Investment
Through Good Governance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2000, at C16.
283. See John William Anderson, Jr., Corporate Governance in Brazil:
Recent
Improvements and New Challenges, 9 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 201, 211-17 (2003) (reviewing the
regulatory scheme of the Novo Mercado and its competitive strategy).
284. Novo Mercado Rules, http://www.bovespa.com.br/Companies/NovoMercadoSpeciall
cias_niveisdifintro_i.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
285. See Bovespa Web site, http://www.bovespa.com.br/indexi.asp (last visited Feb. 17,
2007).
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domestic listings,28 6 it is not currently viewed as a serious competitor in the
global market for listings, even within Latin America.8 7
IV. COMPETITION IN THE GLOBAL LISTINGS MARKET
A.

Defining the Listings Market

The market for listings is thus a dynamic and economically
competitive one where issuers have a menu of choice embodied in three
broad-based regulatory models: high, medium, and low. In this market,
both the low and the medium regulatory models have established
competitive purchase: issuers actively seek out and list in both regimes and
stock markets are incentivized to offer such choice. This has not been true
of the high regulatory model, and this scheme has largely failed to gain
footing among issuers in the global marketplace.
Issuers also further gravitate towards either low or medium regulatory
schemes depending upon their own market capitalization.
Small
capitalized issuers have largely acted to list on low regulation markets,
such as the AIM, rather than subject themselves to high regulation. The
reasons for this preference failure are grist for further study, but include
lower transaction costs and compliance requirements, easier capital raising,
and simple rent seeking by corporate officers.28 8 It may also be due to the
inability of many small capitalized issuers to meet the listings standards of
high regulation markets. Low capitalization issuers have thus historically
been predisposed to weigh these factors over the perceived benefits of a
high regulation market. This weighing is constant, though, and at times
when the benefits of a high regulation market were forcefully apparent,
small capitalized issuers have acted to avail themselves of such high
regulation. This occurred with the Neuer Markt in the midst of the
technology bubble. Small capitalized issuers initially flocked to this
market because of the substantially higher equity rating attributed to listing
issuers.28 9 Yet, this was in an aberrational market, and the premium equity

286. See Boudette, supra note 279.
287. See Prentice, supra note 14, at 1199 (asserting that Novo Mercado "was a great idea
theoretically," but that few companies have been interested in cross-bonding with this market).
The Novo Mercado, though, has experienced a small growth spurt in 2006 and 2007, with twenty
initial public offerings in 2006 and twenty-nine in 2007 (through July 30, 2007). See Antonio
Regalado, Big Brazil Deal Has Investors Callingfor Level Playing Field, WALL ST. J., Jul 30,
2007, at CI.
288. Cf. Stephen J. Choi & Kon Sik Kim, Establishing a New Stock Marketfor Shareholder
Value Oriented Firms in Korea, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 277, 289-90 (2002) (discussing the transaction
costs associated with cross-listing in overseas to higher regulation markets).
289. See After Greed, Fear: No End to the Troubles of the Neuer Markt, ECONOMIST, May
25, 2002, at 73.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

rating for listing thereupon was primarily due to the technology bubble.
Such clear-cut benefits have been otherwise absent in high regulation
markets. Smaller capitalized issuers have therefore, when provided the
option, generally acted to list on lower regulation markets rather than high
ones.
Small capitalized issuers have also tended to list on low regulation
markets when given the choice between middle and low regulation
regimes. For example, as of October 31, 2006, there were 1,186 small
capitalized issuers on the AIM, defined for this purpose as an issuer with a
market capitalization less than $100 million.29 ° In contrast, on the LSE, the
AIM's middle regulation big sister market, the number of small capitalized
issuers on that date was approximately 314.291 The reason for this
preference also requires further study but is likely due to substantially the
same reasons that small capitalized issuers choose to list on low regulation
markets. This preference is transitory, though, and as issuers grow in size,
the benefits of a more highly regulated market typically come to outweigh
the transaction costs. These issuers then tend to migrate towards higher
regulatory regimes as they grow in size either in their own country or
through cross-bonding with a higher regulatory regime in another
jurisdiction.292
Medium- and large-sized issuers have also been sluggish to list on
high regulation markets.293 This failure is puzzling, as some advocate that
these companies should naturally favor this regulatory model as the most
socially and economically optimal one.294 These are established issuers
who can afford the compliance costs; moreover, for these issuers, the lower
cost of capital and higher equity rating provided by a high regulation model
should outweigh these expenses. These issuers also desire the analyst
coverage and thicker capital markets typically more available in a more
highly regulated market. It is for these reasons that medium- and largesized issuers have also tended to eschew the low regulation model. The
AIM and LSE again provide good examples. As of December 31, 2006,
there were 200 issuers listed on the LSE with a market capitalization
290. London
Stock
Exch.,
AIM
Market
Statistics--October
2006,
http://www.londonstockexchange.comNR/rdonlyres/98BE8920-8CFB-483F-8D37-4F006B 12C6
63/0/LISTDATEAIMCOS.XLS (converted from U.K. pounds to U.S. dollars at $1 = £0.5128).
291. London
Stock
Exch.,
Main
Market
Fact
Sheet-October
2006,
http://www.londonstockexchange.comNR/rdonlyres/I 97FE405-BCD3-47E6-83C5-7468B023D
16A/0/MainMarketFactsheetOctober2006.xls (click on "T8 Co's by Value" tab; add data in cells
C 16 through C20).
292. See infra notes 295-98 and accompanying text.
293. This is exemplified by the failure of such markets to develop and those that have
emerged to prosper.
294. See Coffee, supra note 15, at 1763.
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between £500 million and £2 billion and 137 with a market capitalization
over £2 billion, compared to twenty issuers with a market capitalization on
the AIM between £500 million and £2 billion and one on the AIM with a
market capitalization over £2 billion.295 Instead, these issuers tend to
cluster in middle regulatory regimes, migrating from lower regulatory ones
in low
as they grow in size, and the larger capitalized issuers who do stay
296
regulatory regimes arguably do so due to managerial opportunism.
The reason for the counterintuitive preference of larger issuers for
middle, as opposed to high, regulation is uncertain. One possible
explanation is economic: a high regulatory regime may simply be an
overregulated one, with the level of regulation not optimally set to a
particular issuer's private needs. Another reason may be flexibility.
Issuers can typically obtain the thick capital markets and analyst coverage
they desire in middle regulatory regimes; if they want increased regulation,
they can internalize it and self-regulate. This phenomenon has occurred
with many large capitalized issuers such as General Electric. 297 Selfregulation here provides for greater flexibility and reduces liability
exposure while providing the potential for equivalent benefits. Finally, as
with small capitalized issuers and particularly in developed countries, this
preference may sometimes be due merely to the simple inability of an
issuer to meet these higher standards.298
The regulatory market for listings is thus one where middle and low
regulatory products compete for separate pools of issuers. When provided
the choice, small capitalized issuers preferentially list on low regulation
2006,
Sheet-December
Fact
Market
Main
Stock
Exch.,
295. London
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/2EC93ODD-D365-421F-98E1 -65104E I8F
791/0/MainMarketFactsheetDecember2006.xls (click on "T8 Co's by value" tab); London Stock
Exch., AIM Market Statistics-December 2006, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/
NR/rdonlyres/B7C 12B02- 1C60-4B61-8271-33667EBA5D34/0/AimfsO6l2.xls (click on "Co's by
value" tab).
296. This, for example, explains the historical trend of issuers to migrate from the Nasdaq and
American Stock Exchange to the NYSE. The NYSE in the past has been viewed as the more
highly regulated of the three. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance
Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. REV. 325, 355 (2001) ("From 1869 until the mid 1980s the
NYSE tried to differentiate itself from the AMEX and Nasdaq by having higher listing standards
and advertising a blue chip issuer list.").
In the past, General Electric was criticized for
297. This is a recent development.
impenetrable disclosure practices particularly with respect to its Capital Business Unit. It
voluntarily responded by substantially increasing the amount and transparency of its disclosure.
See Rachel Emma Silverman, GE to Change Its Practices of Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20,
2002, at A3.
298. For example, the failure of the new high regulation main market of the Warsaw Stock
Exchange in the mid-1990s to attract a substantial number of issuers has been attributed to its
setting of standards above the capability of its clientele of issuers to meet. See Celia R. Taylor,
Capital Market Development in the Emerging Markets: Time to Teach an Old Dog Some New
Tricks, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 71, 97 (1997).
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markets while medium and larger issuers list on middle regulation markets.
In the face of such diversity of want and in perfect capital markets, the
optimal competitive position for any stock market would be to offer an
array of regulatory choice in order to meet the needs of its consumers, i.e.,
issuers. However, in the midst of this choice and the regulatory market
structure outlined previously, issuers in the developed world still favor
listing in their home markets. Even if their preferred regulatory option is
available, the domestic country bias typically dominates and issuers elect a
less optimal social choice to primarily list in their own jurisdiction. 99 The
global competition for listings is thus not a strong force motivating stock
markets to offer a regulatory menu for domestic issuers. Rather, the driver
of stock market regulatory differentiation with respect to domestic issuers
is primarily a function of alternative capital choices in the domestic market,
such as private shareholding or bank finance.3°°
B.

The Global Marketfor Cross-Listings

Things are different in the global market for cross-listings. A
diversity of regulatory choice here provides a clear competitive advantage.
Issuers may choose to cross-list for non-regulatory reasons; they may
cross-list in another jurisdiction to tap pools of liquidity, raise their nondomestic public profile, gain an international acquisition currency and
shareholder base, or for other reasons.3 ' There is simply no current
academic agreement on a definitive reason why issuers choose to cross-list.
A differentiated regulatory menu is therefore more responsive to this
diversity and places a market on firmer globally competitive footing.
A low regulation listing regime can sometimes be more attractive to
30 2
an issuer looking to cross-list, as it comes at a reduced regulatory cost.
But this is likely to be a red herring for small capitalized issuers. A low
regulation market is unlikely to provide liquidity or other tangible market
benefits to them; rather, trading and liquidity in smaller markets
299. See supra notes 143-55 and accompanying text.
300. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 171-77 (1994).
301. For further discussion of non-regulatory reasons why issuers choose to cross-list, see
Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. Securities Laws?,
75 J. FIN. ECON. 319, 323 (2005); Craig Doidge et al., Private Benefits of Control, Ownership,
and the Cross-Listing Decision 35-36 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
W1 1162, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soll 3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=679321; Amir
N. Licht, Bonding and Dominance in Securities Markets:
Cross-Listing and Corporate
Governance
9-15
(Nov.
2002)
(unpublished
working
paper),
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=668424.
302. This is particularly true since the stock price in the home market tends to dominate the
stock price in the cross-listed market. See Kenneth A. Froot & Emil M. Dabora, How Are Stock
PricesAffected by the Location of Trade?, 53 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 190-91 (1999).
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economically accrues, if at all, to larger issuers. This is exemplified by the
AIM; the bulk of trading on the AIM occurs with respect to its medium and
large issuers. °3 This lack of apparent benefits offered by a lightly
regulated market has led some commentators to view such listings as
primarily a product of managerial opportunism or a simple inability of the
issuer to meet the standards of more highly regulated markets. 3
Meanwhile, for larger issuers, the benefits of such a listing are also sparse.
They may accrue trading liquidity and widen their shareholder base, but to
a lesser extent than if they cross-listed in the target jurisdiction's more
highly regulated market, if one existed. Moreover, the benefits of crossbonding are absent. It is for these reasons that medium and large
capitalized issuers are also less likely to cross-list on low regulation
markets.
A higher regulatory option is thus economically likely to be-and is
today-the preferred market for cross-listing. Issuers who cross-list to
these markets do so for a number of reasons: cross-bonding, a reputational
gain, increased equity rating, thicker capital markets, lower cost of capital,
and other non-regulatory reasons.3 5 Further, the middle level of regulation
offered by these global markets is typically of sufficient weight to provide
the benefits a cross-listing issuer expects. 3 6 This may be one explanation
why high regulation markets have not developed or otherwise attracted
significant numbers of cross-listings. Moreover, cross-listings in low
regulation markets are likely to be the result of managerial opportunism or
the poor quality of an issuer, while a middle regulation cross-listing is more
apt to be a product of sounder financial calculus. A regulator is therefore
likely to be more comfortable with a middle regulation regime for crosslistings. Because of the attractiveness and issuer preference for this type of
regulation, this market is also a more fiercely competitive one among stock
markets. Accordingly, and given the heterogeneity of issuer reasons to

303. See McKINSEY REPORT, supra note 42, at 52 ("Not only is the average daily traded
volume per company on AIM a mere 2 percent of that on NASDAQ, but even that limited
liquidity is highly concentrated in the few companies at the very top end of AIM's market
capitalization range." (exhibit citation omitted)).
304. See generally Licht, Managerial Opportunism, supra note 15 (arguing that cross-listing
to lesser regulated markets are primarily the product of managerial opportunism).
305. See William A. Reese, Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder
Interests, Cross-listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings 1-3, 9 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W8164,
1999), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 94670.
306. See generally Mark H. Lang et al., ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does Cross Listing
in the United States Improve a Finn's Information Environment and Increase Market Value?, 41
J. AccT. RES. 317 (2003) (finding that firms that cross-list on U.S. exchanges have greater analyst
coverage and increased forecast accuracy relative to firms that are not cross-listed).
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cross-list, the ability to offer regulatory choice even within a middle
regulatory choice is an important competitive advantage.
C.

The Global Marketfor Non-Domestic PrimaryListings

There is a final strain in the global listings market: primary listings by
issuers outside their home country market. The listing decisions of these
issuers typically bear the same characteristics as the decisions of issuers in
domestic paradigms. Issuers tend to list abroad in accordance with their
size; small capitalized issuers list in less regulated markets and middle and
larger capitalized issuers list in middle regulation markets. Due to greater
choice among regulatory regimes, this market is more divergent and
competitive than the market for cross-listings, and regulatory flexibility is
likely to enhance a market's competitiveness with respect to potential
listings." 7 A singular example of this is of Israeli issuers who regularly list
on the middle regulation U.S. market in order to avoid the securities law
regime applicable if they otherwise were to list on their home market, the
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. 08
D.

The U.S. Position in the Global Listings Market

The global exchanges have competitively responded to this diversity
of issuer preference by providing products tailored to these needs. The
LSE created the AIM to compete at the lower end of the regulatory sphere
and provide an alternative to the LSE's middle regulatory scheme. 3°9 The
HKSE has taken similar steps by creating its Growth Enterprise Market for
Meanwhile, the Deutsche Borse has
smaller capitalized issuers.310
implemented a three-tiered regulatory system: Prime, General, and Entry.

307. This choice is also likely to allow for greater managerial opportunism in the listing
decision. See Licht, ManagerialOpportunism, supra note 15, at 328-29.

308. Israeli issuers listed on a U.S. market are permitted under Israeli law to make their
disclosures in accordance with the SEC foreign private issuer regime and are not subject to more
stringent Israeli securities law disclosure requirements. See id. at 341, 346 ("By listing, and
remaining listed, only in the American market officers and controlling persons of Israeli issuers
were able to take advantage of its more lenient disclosure regime."). There are currently forty-six
Israeli issuers listed on the NYSE and the Nasdaq in this category. Tel Aviv Stock Exchange,
http://www.tase.co.il/taseeng/marketdata/stocks/marketdata/marketdata.htm?
Data,
Market
action=2 (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). The theory that Israeli issuers list in the United States to
avoid Israeli law has been disputed. See Ariel Yehezkel, Foreign CorporationsListing in the
U.S.-Does Law Matter? Testing the Israeli Phenomenon, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BuS. 351, 400 (2006)

("Minor differences between the two legal systems were found insufficient to justify the decisions
of Israeli corporations to incur the high costs incident to listing in the U.S.").
309. See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
310. See Hong Kong Stock Exchange, About GEM, http://www.hkgem.com/
aboutgem/e default.htm (follow "The Market for Growth Enterprises" hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 17, 2007).
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Each tier is distinguished in terms of both its listing requirements and
regulations.3 '
The primary competitors of the United States thus offer an array of
regulatory choice when it comes to listings and cross-listings. These are
options that the U.S. model does not provide. The U.S. listings market is
subject to one-size-fits-all regulation which varies only if the issuer is a
domestic or non-domestic one.3 12 U.S. stock markets are prohibited from
providing a differing array of regulation below the middle regulation base
level set by the SEC.3" 3 The United States has thus ceded the low
regulation market. And, as we have seen, the United States is losing its
competitive advantage in the middle regulation market as other global
markets become thicker and the equity premium of issuers awarded on
those markets converges with the U.S. market.314
This is the real
phenomenon outlined in Part I. The consequence has been the recent
decline in non-U.S. listings on the U.S. market.
Moreover, beyond these structural failings, there is a growing public
belief that the perhaps inevitable relative decline of the U.S. market has
been hastened by the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and a general

perception that the United States is an overregulated market." 5 Some U.S.
regulators have recognized this problem and both President Bush and
Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson, Jr. have endorsed the need for
some measure of regulatory reform, though they have been parsimonious
311. See Deutsche Borse-Europe's Premier Listing Platform, Market Structure,
http://deutsche-boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/en/kir/gdb-navigation/listing/ I0_MarketStructure
(last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
312. See supra Part III.A.I.
313. The Nasdaq has made some attempts above the U.S. base-level requirements to establish
a tiered market system through its Nasdaq Global Select Market, Nasdaq Global Market, and
Nasdaq Capital Market segments. See Joseph Radigan, Analysis: Blue-Chips Get a Nasdaq Tier
of Their Own, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, Feb. 27, 2006, at 17. Reflecting the preference of large
capitalized issuers for middle, as opposed to high, regulation, the strictest tier of the Nasdaq
market (the Nasdaq Global Select Market) does not impose additional regulatory burdens above
those of the Nasdaq Global Market but rather denotes the Nasdaq segment's requirement of
higher market capitalization and trading liquidity. See NASDAQ GLOBAL SELECT MARKET 1-2
(2006), www.nasdaq.com/about/NASDAQGlobalSelectFS_071206.pdf.
314. The U.S. markets were already losing market share prior to passage of the SarbanesOxley Act. According to one study examining non-U.S. initial public offerings between 1992
through 1999, the percentage of non-U.S. IPOs listing during this time period dropped from
45.8% in 1992 to 9.4% in 1999 and the percentage of the offering amount actually marketed in
the United States dropped from 64.6% in 1992 to 25.2% in 1999. See Alexander P. Ljungqvist et
al., Global Integration in PrimaryEquity Markets: The Role of U.S. Banks and U.S. Investors, 16
REV. FIN. STUD. 63, 69 (2003); see also Doidge et al., supra note 6, at 43 (finding a lack of
support for the "argument that the U.S. exchanges have become less competitive").
315. See, e.g., MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 42, at I I ("[T]he declining position of the US
goes beyond this natural market evolution to more controllable, intrinsic issues of US
competitiveness.").
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with details. 16 Whether this and competing SEC-sponsored initiatives
result in a roll-back of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or a pruning of other
regulation applicable to non-domestic issuers remains to be seen.3" 7 Still,
while there may be some reform, there is no talk of radical change. The
U.S. market will still likely be one where a singular regulation scheme is
applied to all and the U.S. stock markets are legally barred from offering
significantly tailored regulatory choice. The U.S. regulatory market under
current reform proposals is thus likely to remain competitively
disadvantaged in the global listings market; it does not offer the array of
choice other systems do and does not meet the specific desires of its
investors and non-U.S. issuers.
Why is the U.S. regulatory system structured in this manner? There
exists no good answer. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the SEC did
appear in some measure to recognize these disparities. The result was the
alternative scheme for foreign private issuers in effect today." 8 However,
the SEC never enunciated any guiding principle behind this alternative
regulation nor acknowledged the structure of the competitive market for
global listings or the diversified investing needs of U.S. investors.3 19 There
has simply never been an SEC-espoused theory as to the competitive
structure of the U.S. regulatory system for non-U.S. issuers. There only
exists haphazard regulation based in some measure on the SEC's primary
enunciated interest of protecting U.S. investors.3 2° This is small comfort to
the other U.S. actors, including U.S. investors, in this increasingly
globalized world. If the U.S. market is to remain rationally competitive
and the SEC is to meet the interests of its constituents, U.S. securities
regulation must coherently regulate global listings. To build this uniform
theory of regulation, we must first return to principles underlying the global
listings market.
316. See Henry M. Paulson, U.S. Sec'y of the Treasury, Remarks at the Economic Club of
New York on the Competitiveness of U.S. Capital Markets (Nov. 20, 2006) (transcript available
at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp174.htm); John D. McKinnon & Christopher Conkey,
Bush Gives Hope to Foes of Sarbanes-Oxley Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2007, at A4.
317. The SEC has recently taken some steps at this by limiting the scope of Section 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act as it applies to small issuers. See Internal Control Over Financial Reporting
in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Non-Accelerated Filers and Newly Public Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 8760, Exchange Act Release No. 54,942, 71 Fed. Reg. 76,580 (Dec.
21, 2006). For non-U.S. issuers, the SEC has adopted liberal rules to permit non-U.S. issuers to
leave the U.S. markets and de-register their securities with the SEC. See supra note 43.
318. See supra Parts HIA. l & 2.
319. See Palmiter, supra note 123, at 48 (finding that the "SEC's explanations for its
remarkable regulatory dispensations to foreign issuers.., have been terse").
320. While investor protection is part of the SEC's statutory mandate, it has also been
instructed by Congress to consider other market interests. See supra note 166. Additionally,
what constitutes "investor protection" obviously is subject to wide interpretation and has been
influenced by the SEC's own interests.
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V. REGULATING LISTINGS IN A GLOBAL MARKET

A.

FirstPrinciplesand the Regulatory Model

The fundamental interests of the actors in the global markets for
listings were teased forth in Part II in an attempt to delineate the underlying
architecture of the global listings market. Investors generally desire a
regulatory regime that provides global diversification opportunities, basic
protective rights, enforcement capability, and efficient capital markets.32'
Issuers are more heterogeneous; each uniquely desires its own type of
regulatory scheme keyed to its own unique characteristics and dependent
upon its own endogenous preferences.322 Meanwhile, stock markets desire
the highest number of listings and trading volume.323
The current U.S. regulatory regime does not take full account of these
interests. It does not fulfill U.S. investor needs by allowing diversification,
it does not account for the specific regulatory desires of issuers, and it does
not satisfy the U.S. stock markets' need to respond competitively and
attract the highest number of listings and trading volume to their
exchanges.324 Rather, the current market is a product of SEC interests and
focus. The SEC has fulfilled a regulatory mandate to protect U.S. investors
with a singular vision and likely in accord with its own monopolistic
interests, promulgating arguably overbroad issuer regulation in furtherance
of this goal without due regard to the full needs of issuers, investors, and
other actors.3 25 This focus, however, has led to misregulation and both
over- and under-regulation, which has hampered U.S. competitiveness in
the global listings market.
A more globally competitive U.S. market system could be built upon
the actual array of investor needs-the demand side-rather than one
premised simply on protection of investors and SEC interests through
issuer-focused regulation. This shift would provide a principled world
view in order for the SEC to regulate non-domestic issuers consistently and
coherently. In building such a regulatory scheme, the SEC would still take
into account the core protective needs of this interest group. The SEC
would also regulate based on all of the interests of U.S. investors. The SEC
would consequently build a regulatory regime that, subject to the
fulfillment and weighing of all investor interests, would incentivize global

321. See supra Part II.A.
322. See supra Part ll.B.

323. See supra Part II.C.
324. For a discussion of stock markets' competitive interests, see supra notes 184-95 and
accompanying text.

325. See supra Part III.A.
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issuers to list in the United States. This would pay heed to principles of
equality for U.S. investors, as well as provide them the diversified choice
they desire.
This proposal is also one that is likely to dominate a regulatory regime
structured upon supply-side issuer interests. There are at least three
reasons for this. First, the heterogeneity of issuer interests in the global
listings market is likely to make any coherent regulatory norm difficult to
establish. Second, issuer desires for a low regulation option are likely to
heighten management rent seeking and potentially spur a regulatory race to
the bottom in conflict with the interests of investors. Finally, the desire of
issuers for low regulation regimes is often likely to diverge from the baselevel interests of investors. An issuer-focused norm is therefore prone to
reconcile conflicts in favor of issuers to the economic detriment and
unequal treatment of investors. In contrast, as will be detailed in the next
subsection, a regulatory system built on a full array of investor interests
better matches the needs and wants of issuers and investors, has the
potential to better account for their interests, and provides a more coherent
regulatory norm.
B.

Towards a Demand-Side Regulatory Model

The scope of the SEC's shift in regulatory focus still remains open.
The nature of this new regulatory regime rests upon its fulcrum; more
specifically, the parameters of this regulation will lie in the balance the
SEC sets between regulatory relaxation and the holistic needs of U.S.
investors. The product of this weighing should provide not only a guiding
principle for U.S. regulation in the global listings market, but also the
specifics of such regulation. However, any such regulation would be from
the perspective of U.S. investors, the demand side, and should therefore
strive to secure satisfaction of base-level investor interests. The scope of
these interests is obviously debatable, and I would argue that they are
limited to the investor interests outlined in Part II.A. But, by defining a
bundle of minimum and desired necessary investor interests in whatever
measure, the SEC can set a minimum threshold of preferred regulation.
The SEC regulatory process would then attribute strong weight to these
base-level interests against the needs of the other primary actors in the
market-issuers and stock markets-when determining the proper scope of
non-U.S. issuer regulation.
The SEC should consequently craft a regulatory norm that
simultaneously fulfills investors' base interests and maximally frees the
U.S. stock markets to compete and attract non-U.S. issuers. This would
generally result in the following conclusion: for non-U.S. issuers who
already are regulated by middle or high regulatory regimes, the SEC should

2007]

REGULATING LISTINGS

adopt a free-listing regime. Non-U.S. issuers who are so regulated should
be permitted to list without significant regulation in the U.S. market. The
reasons are simple. These issuers are already regulated in their home
market to a sufficient degree. Their home country regulation and the
existence of a substantive enforcing regulator provide the core rights that
investors desire. Therefore, any significant SEC regulation over and above
this threshold may inhibit listings by these non-U.S. issuers.3 26 U.S.
investors would be deprived of investing opportunities they would
otherwise be willing to take,3 27 and discrimination among U.S. investors
would result as sophisticated investors would still maintain the opportunity
to invest abroad in these issuers. Accordingly, the strong weight to be
granted fundamental investor interests and principles of investor equality,
as well as issuer and stock market interests, outweigh the benefits of any
additional protective regulation in this circumstance.
The SEC should therefore promulgate bare-bones compliance
obligations for non-U.S. issuers raising capital or listing in the U.S. market
when the non-U.S. issuer is subject to middle or high regulation in another
jurisdiction. These requirements would primarily encompass the furnishing
of translated home country materials to the SEC and submission to U.S.
jurisdiction. All other regulation, including the antifraud provisions of the
U.S. securities laws, would be inapplicable, provided that the non-U.S.
issuer discloses in the United States the material differences between its
regulatory regime and the U.S. one. Moreover, the SEC would not conduct
its regular and periodic review of such materials, instead deferring to the
non-U.S. issuer's home country regulator.
Relief from the antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws is
likely to be the most controversial element of this proposal. It is also
expected to meet the fiercest SEC resistance as contrary to the agency's
own monopolistic interests; enforcement is one of the primary activities of
the SEC. However, liability exposure under the U.S. antifraud regime,
particularly in private civil actions, is often cited by non-U.S. issuers as the
primary reason why they choose not to list on the U.S. markets. Moreover,
similar disclosure protections are now available in middle regulation
regimes meeting core U.S. investor interests. The big difference between
the United States and other regimes here is in the level of regulator

326. Cf. Larry E. Ribstein, International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising the Rent on
U.S. Law, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 299, 299 (2003) (arguing that the substantive scope of SarbanesOxley could "deter foreign firms from listing in the US").
327. This reflects the global outlook of U.S. investors as supported by current finance theory.
See supra notes I 12-22 and accompanying text.
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enforcement and the availability of private enforcement mechanisms.328 In
the United States, the SEC is more vigorous in enforcement, and private
enforcement options are available, including class actions and the award of
attorneys' fees. Yet, even here, other middle regulation markets are
beginning to provide a private enforcement class action mechanism,
including Australia, the Netherlands, and Germany.32 9 Further, SEC
antifraud enforcement actions against non-U.S. issuers are few and far
between.33 ° In this light, I would argue that the need for U.S. investor
access and equality outweighs the additional protection, if any, provided by
the U.S. antifraud scheme. But, if this proposal proves too controversial or
contrary to SEC interests, a compromise could preserve the SEC's ability
to bring antifraud actions and limit only private litigation to punish
fraudulent conduct. This then becomes an empirical question:
do
recoveries from private antifraud securities law actions against non-U.S.
issuers outweigh the benefits to market actors if this Article's proposal is
adopted? This is also a question that cannot be answered at this time.
Ultimately, though, the designation of any non-U.S. securities law regime
as a qualifying one would be monitored by the SEC and subject to
requalification if that regime's own enforcement mechanisms did not
" ' This
continue to fulfill U.S. investors' minimum protective interests.33
may provide significant and hopefully sufficient comfort to both the SEC
and investors.
The regulatory scheme proposed in this Part is also in greater accord
with conflict-of-laws principles than the one currently in existence. The
Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws largely provides that the governing
law is that of the jurisdiction having a more "significant relationship" to the
transaction and the parties.332 In the international law realm, the United
States has paid heed to this deference in a number of instances. For
example, the United States is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the

328. See Coffee, Impact of Enforcement, supra note 16, at 2 (examining "several explanations
and prefer[ring] the hypothesis that enforcement intensity is a product of the level of retail
ownership in the jurisdiction").
329. See S. Stuart Clark & Christina Harris, Multi-Plaintiff Litigation in Australia: A
Comparative Perspective, II DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 289, 289-90 (2001); Christopher
Hodges, Europeanisationof Civil Justice: Trends and Issues, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 96, 114-20
(2007). France is also considering adopting laws facilitating class action litigation. See Stefano
M. Grace, Strengthening Investor Confidence in Europe: U.S.-Style Securities Class Actions and
the Acquis Communautaire, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 281, 297 (2006).
330. See Siegel, supra note 301, at 335-49 (finding evidence that the SEC has not fully
enforced the U.S. securities law against non-U.S. issuers listed in the United States).
331. This could spur further foreign enforcement and cooperation with the SEC as non-U.S.
regulators become incentivized to retain their designation.
332. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 146-50, 175, 189-96 (1971).
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Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.333 By executing this
multilateral treaty with a particular country, the United States recognizes
and enforces the laws of that foreign jurisdiction as sufficient to properly
award custody rights to a child.3" There is also limited precedent under the
U.S. securities laws for this practice. Under the Multijurisdictional
Disclosure Regime, the SEC has provided comity to Canadian securities
regulators and their securities disclosure and offering laws.33 The United
States has thus, when the interests of its citizens dictated, taken steps to
recognize generally the legitimacy and acceptability of foreign law in
countries meeting pre-specified legal standards, including the enforcement
of such standards. Because the interests of the U.S. actors in the global
listings market militate, the United States should recognize a middle or
high regulatory jurisdiction's securities laws and regulator as governing
due to that jurisdiction's more significant relationship with the regulated
issuer.
Moreover, adoption of this norm will permit stock markets to better
compete for non-domestic issuers in the global listings market.336 Non-U.S.

issuers would now be able to choose to list under this lower-regulation
regime, subject to a higher one in their home market. Otherwise, they
could voluntarily comply with U.S. domestic or foreign private issuer
standards to receive the benefits of cross-bonding to a more highly
regulated U.S. market. In either case, non-U.S. issuers would receive
market benefits tailored to their own desires within the middle and high
regulation markets while more particularly fulfilling U.S. investor
interests.337

Increased utility for all of the relevant actors in the global listings
market would be produced by this shift. U.S. investors would achieve a
positive gain as the increased choice would outweigh any lost regulatory
protection. Non-U.S. issuers would benefit since they would now have a
greater array of regulatory choices better suited to their individualized
needs. U.S. stock markets and other U.S. market actors such as investment

333. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89.
334. Id. at art. 8.
335. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and
Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6902, Exchange Act Release
No. 29, 354, Investment Company Act Release No. 18, 210, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036 (July I, 1991).
336. See Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 153, at 261-65 (arguing that "regulators should
compromise to achieve basic goals focusing on adequate disclosure, investor protection, and

facilitation of cross-border offerings").
337. Moreover, the erection of a mutual recognition regime should engender regulators in
other jurisdictions to adopt a similar approach. They would competitively respond to the SEC's
position by erecting similar regimes. A virtuous circle of mutual recognition is likely to result.
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banks, attorneys, and accountants would gain due to the increased revenue
produced by increasing the number of global U.S. listings, a historically
important growth segment. U.S. stock markets would also gain the
competitive ability to establish graduated levels of regulation and better
compete with other non-U.S. stock markets that currently provide such
products. Moreover, this shift would fulfill SEC needs by attracting nondomestic issuers to the U.S. market and SEC oversight rather than leaving
them and U.S. investments therein unregulated.
This is a better solution for the U.S. market than creating a qualifying
brokerage regime that permits all U.S. investors to invest freely in non-U.S.
issuers outside the United States on foreign stock markets through foreign
brokers or trading screens.338 In such an alternative regime, the SEC and
other U.S. regulators would not maintain any oversight capability over such
non-domestic issuers, however limited. Concomitantly, U.S. investors
would not receive the filtering and reputational benefits that even a lowerthreshold regulatory scheme provides, and they may therefore unwittingly
or irrationally be led into investments which do not meet their minimum
interests. 339 Moreover, the other actors in the U.S. market-stock markets,
attorneys, investment banks, and accountants-would lose market share
under such a regime. A free-brokerage regime as opposed to a free-listing
regime would therefore not produce effective economic results in the
interests of investors and other actors in the U.S. market.
Setting the regulatory balance is harder for non-U.S. issuers who do
not have a home market listing or maintain one in a low regulation
regime. 340 But low regulatory regimes are unlikely to provide the minimum
protections necessary to satisfy investor interests. Therefore, continuance
of the foreign private issuer regime in some form would set an optimal
balance between U.S. investor and others' interests. 341 This would provide
minimum protections to U.S. investors, and it would satisfy their interests
338. See, e.g., Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprintfor Cross-BorderAccess to
U.S. Investors: A New InternationalFramework, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 31, 32 (2007) (advocating
SEC revision of its regulations to permit foreign stock exchanges and broker-dealers to "apply for
an exemption from SEC registration based on their compliance with substantively comparable
foreign securities regulations and laws and supervision by a foreign securities regulator with

oversight powers").
339. See George W. Madison & Stewart P. Greene, TIAA-CREF Response to A Blueprint for
Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J.
99, 100-02 (2007).
340. Cf Edward F. Greene et al., Hegemony or Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements in
the International Capital Markets, 50 Bus. LAW. 413, 416-18 (1995) (arguing for a home
country disclosure scheme when such jurisdiction meets minimum regulatory standards).
341. The foreign private issuer scheme would likely function more appropriately if the SEC
acknowledged that it should apply in varying degrees depending upon the quality of law of the
non-domestic issuer's home country.
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while permitting non-U.S. issuers listed in low regulation markets who
desire to cross-bond the continuing opportunity to comply with this
regulation or voluntarily adhere to even higher U.S. domestic
regulations. 342
Nonetheless, failure to offer a low regulation regime to these non-U.S.
issuers would likely result in a competitive loss for the U.S. markets.343
The loss here is likely to be minimal. The type of non-U.S. issuer who lists
in this regulatory regime is likely to be a smaller capitalized one. 344 These
smaller capitalized issuers are unlikely to legitimately cross-list for
anything other than cross-bonding purposes since, due to otherwise high
transaction costs, they typically seek a primary trading market in their
home country.345 And the possible benefits to market actors other than
investors are low. For example, it is estimated that the market fees derived
3 46
from all AIM listings in 2005 were approximately $700 million,
compared to the roughly $400 million in investment banking fees derived
from the largest initial public offering of 2006, the one of Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China.34 7 The failure of the United States to offer a
low regulation regime is unlikely to affect its competitive status in the
global listings market or with the actors in that market.348
This is also true of primary listed issuers; while their listing choices
are more fractured than cross-listing issuers, they tend to display similar
listing characteristics as domestic issuers.3 49 Here, providing a low
regulation regime would fail to meet the goals of many issuers who seek
out a primary listing for rule-of-law reasons. Rather, a low regulatory
option for primary listing issuers would principally cater to rent-seeking
executives making the listing choice for non-U.S. issuers. Again, these do
not appear to be the type of issuers desirable for the U.S. market or who
satisfy minimum investor interests. Thus, continuation of the foreign

342. Thus, the list of qualifying regulatory regimes under this proposal would be a much
shorter one than the one defining a "designated offshore securities market" for purposes of
Regulation S. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(a) (2007) (encompassing almost all of the foreign stock
exchanges).
343. Approximately half of the issuers listed on the AIM would fail to meet Nasdaq's lowest
initial market capitalization requirement. See McKINSEY REPORT, supra note 42, at 50-51.
344. See supra Part IV.B.
345. Id.
346. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 42, at 51.
347. Tom Mitchell & Geoff Dyer, ICBC Set to Price Mega IPO at Top of Range, FT.COM,
Oct. 19, 2006, http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=icbc+set+to+price+mega+ipo&aje=
true&id=061019005947&ct=O.
348. There is also the risk of losing the next Google or Microsoft, but these issuers are likely
to list in their domestic markets due to other external forces discussed in Part II.B.
349. See supra Part IV.C.
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private issuer scheme in some form for these non-domestic issuers would
also seem appropriate.
CONCLUSION

Recent European and Asian successes with initial public offerings in
their own domestic markets have spurred a common perception in the
United States that the U.S. capital market is losing the competitive race for
global listings. The reasons most often cited are overregulation of the U.S.
market and the excessive propensity in the United States towards private
securities litigation. Yet, this explanation ignores the natural comparative
growth of Asia and Europe, the maturation of the U.S. market, and the
historical failure of non-U.S. stock exchanges to meaningfully compete for
cross-listings. It also ignores the structure of the global listings market
where domestic issuances in the developed world are largely captive of
their home country market. Rather, the global listings market is a
competition confined largely to cross-listings and primary listings by
issuers from developing nations. Accordingly, talk of losing the race when
it includes domestic issuers fails to recognize the market's nature and
merely acknowledges the internal growth and increasing strength of capital
markets outside the United States.
Moreover, non-domestic issuers express no uniformity of taste for a
certain level of regulation when deciding to list abroad. The individualized
interests of non-domestic issuers dictate their preference for a cross-listing
or a non-domestic primary listing in a particular type of regulatory regime.
For example, small capitalized issuers are likely to prefer low regulation
regimes, larger capitalized ones are likely to prefer middle regulation
regimes, and very few issuers are likely to prefer high regulation regimes.
In such a world, it is hard to attribute the recent relative U.S. decline to a
single reason such as overregulation. This is particularly true since markets
outside the United States have also experienced recent declines in the
number of non-domestic listings or otherwise failed to attract such listings
competitively. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the U.S. capital markets are
deficient. They fail to meet non-issuer desires and offer the tailored
regulatory product that non-U.S. issuers require in today's competitive
global listings market. Instead, the U.S. market offers one-size-fits-all
securities regulation that is not compatible with the individualized needs of
non-U.S. issuers, and lags behind the regulatory choice offered by other
markets. This is a sounder explanation for the recent decline in non-U.S.
listings on the U.S. market, one that takes into account the overregulation
thesis but pays heed to other factors that have influenced this downward
listing trend.
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Yet, proposals to ameliorate this problem have all suffered from the
same analytical flaw: they have approached this issue from the perspective
of the supply side-arguing that regulation should be structured to meet the
desires of issuers. A more sustainable regulatory norm could be reached if
we instead look to the full array of U.S. investor interests. The SEC should
define the minimum bundle of U.S. investor interests to set a threshold
level of preferred regulation. It should then strongly weigh these interests
against the needs of other actors in the global listings market to establish
not only a guiding principle for U.S. regulation in the global listings
market, but also the specifics of such regulation. This SEC weighing
would conclude that the U.S. investor interest in diversified investments
should be fulfilled so long as remaining base-level investor interests were
also met.
The SEC would consequently create a free-listing regime that would
permit non-U.S. issuers listed in regulatory regimes sufficiently equivalent
to the U.S. market to list on U.S. stock markets without additional
substantive U.S. regulation. This scheme would permit issuers already
listed in most middle regulatory regimes-that is, in the developed worldto list on a U.S. stock market with only bare-bones compliance obligations.
In comparison, non-U.S. investors without a primary listing in the United
States or with a home country listing in a low regulation regime are
typically not regulated in their home country to a level satisfactory to U.S.
investor base-level interests. These non-U.S. issuers would therefore still
be regulated to a higher level that would be substantially similar to, but
more contoured than, the current foreign private issuer scheme. Finally,
those non-issuers wishing to cross-bond or otherwise desiring a higher
level of U.S. regulation could still voluntarily elect for such higher
regulation to apply or otherwise demand such higher regulation from U.S.
stock markets.
The adoption of such a regulatory norm by the SEC would establish a
non-monopolistic general principle for future SEC regulation of non-U.S.
issuers which encompasses notions of investor equality and access. It
would be a more coherent norm for regulating and structuring a U.S.
capital market, creating a regulatory scheme better able to compete in the
global market for listings and meet the individualized nature of the nondomestic listing decision. This approach would therefore not simply
benefit investors, but would take into account all of the interests of the
main actors in the global listings market to arrive at Pareto efficient
outcomes for all. In other words, everyone wins.
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